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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
T HE Soviet Union began to build a socialist economy as early as 1917. It has
achieved what communist economists call the first stage on the road toward
communism, i.e., a socialist economy, and is now building a communist economy.
The other planned economy countries had a much later start, after World War
II. Naturally their respective degree of socialization of the economy is much
less advanced. On the one hand, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany
claim a transitory stage, something in between capitalism and socialism. On the
other, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania claim to have achieved a
socialist economy which is now undergoing a process of further improvement.
In fact, it is difficult to detect a difference in the degree of socialization of the
different economies. There are no economic factors that could objectively justify
calling the first group popular democracies (a misnomer, having no economic con-
notation) and the second, socialist republics. Yugoslavia aside, all other planned
economy countries follow, to a very important degree, the Russian model of
economic development giving priority to the steel industry and mining. It may
be that the close attention paid to Soviet experience was an important factor in
the recent adoption by Rumania of a more independent political line. When the
Soviet Union suggested at a 1963 Comecon1 meeting that Rumania should put
more emphasis on development of agriculture and the lumber industry and slow
down its drive for more steel, the Rumanians felt betrayed. They thought it was
unfair for the Soviets to dissuade their younger allies from following the success-
ful line of Soviet economic development built primarily on heavy industry. Their
reaction was a renewed determination to continue the development of steel and
extractive industries. Upon Soviet refusal to cooperate in the building of the
country's most important and expensive siderurgic combine, Rumania, started
to build stronger commercial ties with the free world and seek cooperation in
Western Europe for building the "Galati" siderurgic combine and other pro-
jects.2 Moreover, Rumania's new independent line and increasing trade with the
free world caused more scientific and cultural intercourse with the Western
countries. It is partly due to this orientation that Rumanian legal and economic
institutions can be more accurately studied and analyzed by interested west-
erners.
This article will attempt to analyze one Rumanian institution (typical of
1. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was formed and joined in 1949 by
U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, and then subsequently
,by Eastern Germany and Albania. Yugoslavia never became a member.
2. See, e.g., "Portile de Fier" hydroenergetic and navigation combine, project on the
river Danube, HCM 435 of July 3, 1964.
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all planned economies), namely, the "contract of delivery" entered into by state
enterprises pursuant to planned "tasks" and "allocations."
Some introductory remarks may be helpful for a better understanding of
Rumanian economic law:
First, the decision to follow the Soviet model of economic development
brought with it respect for the Soviet science of planning- and this respect has
remained unchanged in spite of the new independent line. It is a paradox that
while officials of the Soviet Communist Party are criticized for their ideologically
erroneous attempt to create big brother and small sister countries within the
family of communist nations, while compulsory studying of Russian is aban-
doned and high school students have a choice between English, French, and
Russian, Soviet planners and economic lawyers maintain their prior status as
authorities. Bratus, Halfina, Novitzki, Luntz, and other Soviet jurists dealing with
problems of economic law are as highly regarded and as often cited as they were
prior to the independent line. Their importance for Rumanian economic law
still equals that of Ionascu, Barasch, Statescu, or Popescu.
Secondly, Rumania has a very strong civil law, to be more precise, French
civil law, background. Rumania was a Turkish colony for centuries and not until
late in the nineteenth century were the two provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia
(Muntenia) merged into independent Rumania. The newly created country chose
to become a kingdom. When the German prince Karl von Hohenzollern was
offered the crown, the state was faced with having a king and independence but
no legal system to go along with it. So the Rumanians did what may be charac-
terized as most expedient. They adopted in 1865 as their own: (a) the Belgian
constitution, (b) the French civil code, and (c) the Italian criminal code, all
three of which were believed to be the most advanced of their kind. The result-
ing nationl legal system indebted to the French by reason of the Napoleonic
Code came under further French influence because a substantial number of
Rumanian lawyers were trained at French universities. jurists trained in France
gained a virtual monopoly of Rumanian law professorships. French training con-
tinued (with brief interruption during both world wars) until 1948.3 The last
nineteen years in the Soviet orbit have been insufficient to overcome the solid
French background. Many of today's leading economic lawyers were educated
in France. For instance, Traian Ionascu formerly taught civil law at Victor
Babes law school and until 1948 from French textbooks. (The author was one
of his students.) Two short decades would probably, be insufficient to eradicate
such a strong tradition in any part of the world.
Thirdly, Rumanians adapt very easily. The above described genesis of the
national legal system may be an illustration of Rumanian expediency. The
Soviet science of planning and economic law was just as easily domesticized.
Furthermore, due to the smaller size of the country, many of the Soviet compli-
3. D. 175 of Aug. 3, 1948 (Educational Reform Law) shifts from the French to the
Soviet model of legal education.
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cations were avoided. The lack of information and of a federal system did not
plague Rumanian planning as it did the Soviets. A historical prospective of
Soviet trials and errors made it possible for the Rumanians to avoid some of the
difficulties and develop a command economy without undergoing major reorgani-
zations.
Lastly, more than in any other planned economy, lawyers play an active
role in the economy. Rumania has a relatively high number of legally trained
persons, a substantial proportion of which are employed as corporation counsel.
Under Rumanian law, every enterprise, large or small, has to have a legal office
with one or more attorneys, depending upon size.4 Attorneys in such offices are
not members of the bar. They are employees with fixed incomes. In 1948, when
the legal profession was newly organzied under socialist principlesu about 80%o
of the members of the bar were expelled for political reasons such as participa-
tion in politics or wealth. However, they were not disqualified from becoming cor-
poration counsels. As political influence and wealth are likely to come rather late
in a lawyer's career, the body of corporation counsels, that emerged from the
reform, was a group of older lawyers with a strong civil background and trained
in traditional legal concepts and terminology, in contrast with the group of
younger members of the bar. Its Soviet origin notwithstanding, economic law
became the specialty of conservative lawyers dealing in traditional legal concepts
and language.
An introductory remark about the terminology used:
The term delivery (supplying) contract has a different meaning within the
legal system of a market economy and that of a command economy. While in a
market economy it may refer to an agreement entered into pursuant to the free
will of contracting parties (who could just as easily have abstained from contract-
ing), in a command economy it deals with contracts entered into pursuant to an
economic plan leaving less, or in many cases no, choice to the parties. It should be
stated from the outset, that it is the second category that will be analyzed. The
analysis will be limited to contracts concluded by two state enterprises and deal-
ing with delivery of goods. The topic as limited above is by no means the only
logical treatment of the subject. As a matter of fact, Rumanian scholars some-
times lump together into a single group all contracts between state enterprises, in-
cluding contracts for service. 6 Others would accord separate treatment to all con-
tracts having at least one state enterprise participant.7 A further group of writers
distinguish between "planned" contracts having both the sale and the purchase
specifically set forth in the plan and the merely "regulated" contracts where
either the purchase or the sale is specified in the plan without the other party to
4. D. 403 of Sept. 23, 1955, arts. 1-2, in Col. 15.
5. Law 3 of Jan. 19, 1948, in Col. 11,
6. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, Teoria Generala a Contractelor Economice I (General theory
of economic contracts I) 47 (Buc. Ed. Ac. 1963).
7. Onescu, Notiunea si Definitia Contractului Economic [The concept and definition
of economic contracts], [1961J 1 JN 71.
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the future transaction being named.8 Whatever the logical justification for a dif-
ferent approach, the limitation to a very important group of contracts has the
virtue of making the analysis less difficult and more understandable. Moreover it
should be noted that leading Soviet jurists have chosen the identical category
as their topic of a comprehensive study.9
Because many institutions are common to Rumania and other eastern
European communist countries, except Yugoslavia, the terminology of communist
countries or iron curtain states may not be adequate and may also have a politi-
cal connotation urinecessary for this study. For this reason the choice fell upon
"planned economy countries" or "planned economies" as a shorthand expression
for the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany,10 Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria. As used in this study the term never includes France or
any country using planning that has not been enumerated above.
I. MANDATORY CONTRACTING
A. Introduction
The title is suggestive of a contradiction. There is a tendency to associate
contracts with freedom of contract, with the right to abstain from entering into
an agreement. One must forget such traditional principles for purposes of the
analysis which follows. Marxism has a theoretical justification for the non-
existence of the choice or right to abstain from contracting. It denies that choice
has ever existed under any legal system because under capitalism, economic
realities and pressures make any free choice illusory. The following discussion
will not dwell upon possible theoretical justifications for socialist concepts. Focus
will be upon meaning, role, and purpose within the framework of a planned
economy.
As a general rule, a state enterprise is neither bound nor entitled to fulfill
a planned task without first entering into a contract. "The plan standing alone
does not generate any concrete obligation that may be fulfilled by a state enter-
prise." "l It is the prevailing view in Soviet literature, and the literature of other
planned economies as well, that a delivery contract is indispensable for the
existence of any right and duty.
As a matter of practical necessity, most often the plan is insufficiently de-
tailed and does not enable the parties to proceed without further inquiry as to
what they are expected to do. The filling in of the details is always a practical
necessity and constitutes for Rumanian lawyers the primary function of the
8. Constantinescu, Despre Contractele Reglementate [Regulated contracts], [1953] 3
JN 303.
9. S. Bratus & L. Luntz, Problems of Economic Contracts 4 (Moscow Gosiurozdat
1964).
10. Hereinafter referred to as Germany.
11. 1. Novitzki & L. Luntz, Teoria Generala a Obligatiunilor in U.R.S.S. [General theory
of obligations in the U.S.S.R.] (Buc. ESPLS 1953); Bratus, Contractul Economic, Forma
Juridica Civila de Repartitie a Productiei Intre Intreprinderile de stat [The economic con-
tract, a civil law method of allocating production among state enterprises], [1953] 3
JN 308.
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plan.12 But the question remains: When there is an exceptional case and the
plan is sufficiently explicit with respect to all obligations of the parties so that
there remains nothing for the contract to specify in addition to the plan, are the
parties entitled to performance on the basis of the plan alone, or may the ab-
sence of a contract constitute a good defense for nonperformance?
B. The Minute Specification Theory
Rumanian Arbitraj consistently held that there is no duty to perform a
planned task when a contract is lacking.
While the deepening (filling in the details) of the plan is as a general
rule the primary function of contracts, there are many other functions
as well, and one may not disregard them. Minute specifications con-
tained in the plan may make further deepening a useless formality.
Nevertheless, fulfillment of the planned task is not called for when no
contract exists.' 3
In ihis respect, Rumanian practice differs from that of Bulgaria. A cele-
brated decision of the Highest Bulgarian Arbitraj' 4 held that it is within the
discretion of arbitraj to compel preformance of planned tasks in the absence of
a contract, provided the plan is sufficiently detailed and explicit with respect to
the reciprocal obligations of the parties. The Bulgarian decision, an exponent of
the so-called minute specification theory, was criticized by Rumanian scholars
for failing to recognize the important roles of delivery contracts in addition to
deepening of the plan. "The more details there are in the plan the more oppor-
tunities there are for errors and the more important the contract becomes as a
device for checking planning errors" argues a leading authority.'5 "The solution
in case of the overly detailed plan is not to dispense with the contract but rather
to compel its conclusion."' 6
Whatever the theoretical difference between the Rumanian and Bulgarian
approaches to the problem of the detailed plan, there is practically no differ-
ence in result because, in both states as well as in all the other planned econo-
mies, contracting for funded goods is compulsory.' 7 State enterprises are required
to contract shortly after taking cognizance of their planned tasks.' 8 If either
potential party to a contract fails to take the necessary steps leading toward the
conclusion of a contract, it may be compelled to do so.' 9 Consequently, the plain-
tiff in Bulgaria may sue directly for performance, while in Rumania he achieves
12. T. Ionascu & E. Barascb, Teoria si Practica Litigiilor Precontractuale [Theory and
practice of precontractual litigation] 118-19 (Buc. Ed. Ac. 1962).
13. Instr. PAS 7266 of May 3, 1954, [1956] 1 AS 59-61; see also Instr. PAS 31 of
June 17, 1957, [1957] AS 56; Dec. PAS 3494 of Dec. 5, 1956, [1957] 2 AS 58; Dec. Arb.
Reg. Mures 188 of March 27, 1956 [1956] 4 AS 59.
14. Dec. Arb. Supr. (Bulg.) of Oct. 25, 1958 Pr. Arb. No. 258.
15. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 128-29.
16. Id. at 129.
17. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949 (Rum.), art. 1; D. 199 of May 14, 1949 (Rum.),
art. 27.
18. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8.
19. Law 5 of Aug. 5, 1954, Arbitraj Law, art. 10(1).
380
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the same result by first demanding that defendant be compelled to contract. The
only occasion when it would make a difference, would occur when both parties
neglected their duties to get in touch until the allocation order has become in-
operative2" (after December 31). However, in view of the fact that such neglect
constitutes a misdemeanor 2l or can give rise to a disciplinary act 2 2 under the
law of either country, it is most unlikely that such neglect would occur fre-
quently.
C. The Superimposition of Duties Theory
All planned economies agree that there is a duty to contract. There are
differences in approach concerning the nature of the duty, whether it is admin-
istrative, civil, or both. There are also differences in the procedure intended to
bring about the desired result. Under some laws the seller has the obligation to
make the first step, while under others the burden falls to the buyer. Sometimes
both parties may have the concurrent obligation to take the initiative. There is
considerable variance concerning grounds upon which a motion to compel con-
tracting may be resisted. However, one basic obligation is common to all planned
economies: everywhere contracting on the basis of the plan is mandatory.
Under Rumanian law the obligation to enter into a contractual relationship
is twofold: administrative and civil.
(a) The administrative duty to contract: As soon as the seller acquires
knowledge of its duties under the plan, it has an administrative obligation to
enter into a contractual relationship with the beneficiary specified in the plan,
or to take the first necessary steps in order to ascertain who the beneficiary is
when not specifically designated. Failure to act may result in disciplinary or
even criminal liability for the negligent employees.2 3 Furthermore, it may result
in diminution of the director's fund2 4 and the loss of bonuses and other incen-
tives for the staff of the enterprise at fault.2 5 There seems to be a consensus
among the jurists of planned economies in this respect.26
(b) The civil duty to contract: Jurists in most planned economies have
difficulty in rationalizing the private right of action to compel contracting solely
as an outgrowth of an administrative duty. The explanation for this conceptual
difficulty may reside in the traditional dichotomy between administrative duty
giving rise to a public action on the one hand, and a civil duty giving rise to a
private action on the other. Most jurists elaborate on the existence of a second
20. Under the Bulgarian view compensation could be awarded, but under the Ruman-
ian view it could not. On operative validity of allocation orders, see generally infra Part
III(F), pp. 397-402.
21. Rum. Pen. Code arts. 242 (criminal negligence), 245 (abuse).
22. D. 255 of Aug. 29, 1953, arts. 1-2.
23. Id. See also Rum. Pen. Code arts. 242, 245.
24. HCM 1653 of Oct. 8, 1955.
25. Instr. CSP, MF & CC Sind. 2321 of Oct. 8, 1955.
26. I. Novitzki & L. Luntz, supra note 11, at 101; 0. Ghenchin, Soviet Civil Law
ch. XIX, § 1(9) (Moscow 1950).
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and distinct duty of a civil character that can be enforced through a motion to
compel contracting.
(c) The superimposition theory: With the exception of Hungarian jurists,
who recognize administrative law as the sole source of the duty to contract and
who analyze a motion to compel contracting in terms of an administrative
remedy privately enforced,27 and except for an isolated contrary view of a Soviet
jurist whose theory is the nonexistence of any duty other than a civil duty to
contract,28 the great majority of the jurists of planned economies, including the
Soviets, talk about an administrative duty plus a superimposed civil duty to
contract,
29
A typical statement of this theory of superimposition of duties having iden-
tical objects is that given by a classic of Rumanian economic law:
Reciprocal rights and obligations of state enterprises do not and can
not originate from an admistrative duty to contract. An obligation
toward the state may not generate private rights of action for state
enterprises which all have planned tasks and which are all equal in
relation to each other. For reciprocal duties (and rights) to exist, it is
necessary to advance from administrative law into the sphere of civil
law, The administrative action of planning in addition to assigning
concrete tasks creates a civil law relationship between the parties, the
object of which is the duty (and right) to make a contract. A contrary
view seems to be in disregard of the fundamental feature of an admin-
istrative law relationship, namely that of subordination of one party to
another. It would be a departure from a generally accepted view to
contend that administrative law generates a civil duty to contract en-
forceable through private right of action, to contend that in addition to
the administrative duty to contract it enables the parties to make a mo-
tion to compel contracting. Such a contention ignores how effective
civil law remedies can be when they are complementary to administra-
tive remedies in furtherance of the same goal, that of malting certain
that a contract will be entered into. By misunderstanding an essential
feature of delivery contracts, such as that of having at their disposal
administrative and civil remedies to ensure that an administrative and
a civil duty to contract will be fulfilled, a correct analysis of delivery
contracts and their special problems becomes very difficult indeed.80
One can easily discern the author's struggle to deal with a novel institution,
such as a planned relationship, in traditional terms of administrative and civil
duties. The authors justify their refusal to conceive that administrative duties
may generate civil actions, by their intention not to depart from generally ac-
cepted views. However, they fail to take into account that the particular kind of
27. See G. Eorsy, Contractele planificate [Planned contracts] ch. IV, § 13(3) (Buc.
1956).
28. Mojeico Contractual Economic in U.R.S.S. [The economic contract in the U.S.S.R.]
(Moscow 1962).
29. Klinger & Panzer, Zur Wirtschaftsleitenden Bewustseinsbildling [On formation of
conscientious industry leaders], [1960] 3 Staat und Recht 462-63; T. Ionascu & E. Barasch,
supra note 12, at 348. On Soviet law, see H. Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R. 135 (1963).
, 30. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 143.
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civil action necessary to compel contracting is not really a civil action in the
traditional sense of the word. It is not only a remedy that an aggrieved party
may elect, but is at the same time an obligation of the "aggrieved" party to sue,
and failure to do so may bring a disciplinary sanction or criminal prosecution.
The mandatory nature of the suit to compel contracting, may perfectly justify
the Hungarian analysis in terms of an administrative remedy. Indeed, function-
ally the private "right" of action is very much like any other administrative
obligation: the plaintiff may be as unhappy about the planned contractual rela-
tionship as is the defendant, but nevertheless has to take the necessary steps to
comply with the plan against his own desires.
The real reason underlying the majority analysis in terms of civil duties and
remedies may rather be found in a general reluctance of planned economies to
characterize their institutions as being of an administrative character. Civil law
in the public mind is associated to a certain degree with private initiative and
efficiency as opposed to administrative law, which is more connected with notions
of a lack of freedom and inefficiency. It is preferable, psychologically, to present
things as if they were utterly decentralized, as if success of the plan depends
upon the deliberate choice of each state enterprise and each staff member in-
volved. 3 ' Regardless of how much freedom of action for the individual enter-
prises may be found in a thoroughly regulated field, such as delivery contracts,
jurists, with the exception of the Czechs, continue to speak in terms of civil
duties, private rights of action, and civil law, refusing to accept the notion of a
new economic law. Their attitude tends to present the system in a form that is
more acceptable to the people's aspiration for more freedom and private initia-
tive.
D. The Advance Action Theory
A widely accepted, though not unchallenged, theory in planned economy
states relates to the existence of a duty on the part of state enterprises to prepare
for future contracts. As soon as the plan becomes known, and the state enterprise
has sufficient knowledge enabling it to work on its tasks, it cannot idly sit by and
wait until all procedures leading to the contract are fulfilled and the contract
signed, but rather has an affirmative duty to inquire about raw materials, orga-
nize production, and even to start work while the exchange of letters with the
buyer takes place or even while precontractual litigation settles the differences
between the parties.8 2 The existence of such a duty has never been tested in
31. "It is not difficult to imagine a planned economy in which the lower agencies
slavishly perform their tasks as small gears in a huge machine. The contractual doctrine
encourages the economic agencies, the enterprises to feel that they themselves undertake the
tasks, working out and concluding the contracts which alone bind them." Mihaly, The Role
of Civil Law Institutions in the Management of Communist Economies: The Hungarian
Experience 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 310, 315-16, cited by H. Berman, supra note 29, at 140.
32. See Statescu, Arbitrajul de Stat si Practica Arbitrala [Arbitraj and arbitral prac-
tice] 1959-60 An. Tin. Parhon SSJ 13-14; I. Novitzki & L. Luntz, supra note 11, at 103;
D. Mojeico, supra note 28, at ch. III § 3(5). But see T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note
6, at 146-48.
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court, mainly for two reasons. First, the proof is very difficult and the quantum
of damages resulting from lack of advance action is very hard to assess. It is
easier for plaintiffs to claim compensation for late contracting or late delivery,
in which case it is not necessary to prove any failure on the part of defendant
and, in which case, there are no worries about the measure of recovery because
the contract fixes the damages to certain percentage of the selling price.,,
Secondly, the burden of proof of lack of negligence is on the defendent and it is
fair to say that the burden can virtually never be carried successfully. The
plaintiff is very rarely required to submit any proof other than the number of
days of delay.34
The existence of a duty to take advance action would, in fact, bring Rumanian
law very close to the much discredited minute specification theory of the Highest
Bulgarian Arbitraj, to the effect that a seller is under a duty to perform when a
sufficiently detailed plan enables him to do so. The advance action theory may
even be a more radical blow to the importance of contracts, because it forces
state enterprises to act without a contract in all cases and not just in the excep-
tional case of an overly detailed plan. Although the two theories are very similar
in nature and effect, the advance action theory is psychologically preferable to
the minute specification theory, because it bases the duty to act on contract
rather than on a command of the planning authority. This may account for the
isolation of the more logical Bulgarian view and the popularity of the somewhat
forced theory based on a contract that has not been concluded.
E. The Theory of Incorporation
There is a consensus among planned economy lawyers, that delivery con-
tracts incorporate the following by implication if they fail to do so in express
terms: (1) the plan; and (2) fundamental principles of the state's economic
policy. The theory has its origin in the statutes directing arbitraj, when deciding
a case, to take into account the-plan and economic policy. Rumanian law has
such a provision35 as does the law of other planned economies.30 Rather than
considering the activities of arbitraj as overriding the contract and imposing
external elements, scholars have preferred to consider the activity as an enforce-
ment of implied contractual clauses. The practical consequences of such an in-
corporation is a drastic reduction of invalid contracts. As will be explored in
more detail later, delivery contracts having illegal clauses will at the same time
contain implied legal ones. All the court has to do in such a case is to choose
between two conflicting clauses, and naturally its choice must fall upon the im-
plied legal ones.37 In the phase of precontractual litigation, the incorporation of
33. See, e.g., St. on Del. Prod., 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2, at 23 (U.S.S.R. 1965); D.
265 of June 25, 1949, art. 2(b) (Rum.).
34. On burden of proof see generally infra Part VII(A), pp. 424-26.
35. Law 5 of Aug. 5, 1954, art. 24.
36. See, e.g., State Arbitraj Law of 1960, art. 18, para. 1 (Bulg.); Law of Nov. 8,
1958, §§ 4-7 (Czech.). On Soviet law, see H. Berman, supra note 29, at 126.
37. See Law of Aug. 5, 1954, art. 25; Dec. Arb. CM 2942 of June 29, 1961; T. Ionascu
& E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 407. See generally infra Part IV/c.
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the economic policy presents no theoretical difficulties. It is not in disregard of
the role delivery contracts are supposed to play because no contracts have been
concluded as yet. The practice is hailed as the best safeguard of the interests
of both parties and that of the State.38 A more delicate problem is presented
when a contract exists and in the name of contract discipline its clauses should
be denied enforcement. The apparent conflict between an adjudication based on
the law of the parties as expressed in their contract and administrative-ecomonic
expediency as materialized in general economic policy is eliminated by the ingen-
ious incorporation of the second into the first. As the leading Rumanian treatise
states:
What is true for arbitraj in precontractual litigation is equally true for
both parties. Having demonstrated its applicability/of the theory of
incorporation/to arbitraj we are relieved of the necessity of repeating
the argument with respect to the parties. Both parties and arbitraj
have a duty to take into account, in the manner prescribed, the general
principles of economic policy which is another expression of central-
ized regulation of delivery contracts. It is a concept that escapes ade-
quate consideration by some jurists and so we find it necessary to dwell
upon it: An essential method of getting the final version of a delivery
contract is this procedure of supplementing its content. 39
F. Centralized Regulation
The theory of incorporation was mentioned as an expression of centralized
regulations. Another expression of the same kind of regulation is the body of
basic conditions of delivery, as they are called in Rumanian law40 or special
conditions of delivery, to use the Soviet statutory language.4 1 They are in essence
regulations differing from industry to industry, governing quality of goods,
methods of reception, packaging and shipment, conventional penalties and fines
for breach of contract. State enterprises having similar activities must incorpo-
rate by reference into all their delivery contracts the basic conditions of delivery
of their respective industry.42 Yet another expression of centralized regulation
are general contracts concluded by higher economic authorities in the name of
the subordinate enterprise,4 3 mandatory clauses that must appear in every con-
tract,44 and prohibited clauses that may not be used.4 5
While basic conditions and other centralized regulation, when taken sepa-
38. See W. Saliupa & J. Donde, Arbitrajul de stat in U.R.S.S. [Arbitraj in the U.S.S.R.]
56-57 (Buc. ESLEJ 1954); Severin, Arbitrajul de Stat Contribue la Dezvoltarea Bazei
Economice a Socialismuiui in R.P.R. [The contribution of arbitraj to the development of a
socialist economic basis in Rumania], [1959] 4 JN 691.
39. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 191.
40. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 1; 11CM 75 of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 1.
41. See H. Berman, supra note 29, at 123.
42. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 2.
43. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 4.
44. D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 2. On mandatory clauses see generally infra Part
I(E), P. 397.
45. D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 3. On prohibited clauses see generally infra Part
I1(F), pp. 397-401.
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rately, would leave room for private initiative, one has to take into account the
fact that they are all interrelated, so that a future analysis of additional aspects
of delivery contracts is necessary before arriving at any conclusion as to
their nature and role in the legal and economic system of Rumania.
II. CONTRACTING PROCEDURE
A. Contracting Campaign
As a general rule, all contracts must be entered into within a period called
the "contracting campaign," which starts after the plan for the following year
is made public and ends before that plan goes into effect, or, to use planning
terminology, starts after the launching of and ends before the start of the annual
plan. In Rumania, timing and duration of the contracting campaign is subject
to annual determination by the Council of Ministers.40 All planned economies
use contracting campaigns,4 7 though their timing, duration and procedure may
vary; e.g., in Soviet law, timing and duration is determined as part of the five
year plan and is not subject to change. As a matter of practice in Rumania, the
campaign lasts from six to seven weeks and takes place in October and Novem-
ber of each year. For example, for the years 1961 and 1962, provision was made
for the campaign to last from October 1 to November 15 of the preceding year,
allowing thirty days for signing most of the domestic contracts and forty-five
days for entering into contracts involving machinery used for export trade.48
The reason for such an early contracting campaign is to enable the enter-
prises to organize adequately for the plan, and to enable planning authorities to
correct eventual errors that may be revealed as a result of the contracting
campaign.49
B. Post Campaign Contracting
The last day of the contracting campaign does not operate as a statute of
limitations and does not bar an action to compel contracting. If there were a
failure to contract, the guilty enterprise would be subject to fines, damages, loss
of funds for bonuses, etc.,50 the negligent employees would have to face disci-
plinary penalties or even criminal liabilityr' but a contract would still have to
be entered into.
C. Operative Validity
The duty or right to contract continues as long as the planned tasks and
allocations are operative and this is generally until the last day of the plan,
December 31. There are two important qualifications to the general rule: (a)
46. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 9, para. 1.
47. See, e.g., D. CM of April 21, 1949, art. 2 (USSR); Hung. Civ. Code art. 398(1).
48. See [1960] Joint Res. CSP & PAS 26; [1961] Joint Res. CSP & PAS 18,
49. See Editorial "Scinteia" (official daily newspaper of the Rumanian Workers'
Party) Dec. 27, 1961 at 5397; T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 213.
50. HCM 1653 of Oct. 8, 1955; Instr. CSP, MF & CC Sind. of Oct. 8, 1955.
51. Rum. Pen. Code arts. 242, 245; D. 255 of Aug. 29, 1953, arts. 1-2.
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Special provisions in the plan or separate legislation sometimes establish a
shorter or longer operative validity for certain tasks and allocations. For in-
stance, allocations of perishable farm products often have an operative validity
of three months 52 as opposed to tasks involving construction, for which the
period is two years.53 It should be noted that the practice of planning in install-
ments for each trimester separately" does not affect the operative validity of the
allocation, which remains annual. An allocation order providing for 1,000 units
in trimester 1, 1,000 in trimester II, 1,000 in trimester III and 1,000 in trimester
IV of the year 1968 and, unless subject to the limitation discussed below, arbi-
traj may compel the parties to enter into a contract as late as December, 1968. 5
(b) The operative validity notwithstanding, arbitraj does not compel contract-
ing and must deny enforcement of allocation orders when it is certain that the
task can no longer be fulfilled because of the delay. Such exceptions are very
strictly construed. For instance, in 1956, a suit was brought upon an allocation
order for wool to be produced by a farm and delivered during the second tri-
mester of 1956. The plaintiff petitioned to arbitraj to compel the defendant farm
to make a contract, although he had failed to sue during the contracting cam-
paign which took place in October of 1955. Plaintiff was late even with respect
to the delivery date set forth in the allocation order. Defendant opposed the suit
on two alternative grounds. First, that the operative validity of the allocation
order had expired on June 30, 1955; and, second, the allocation order should be
denied enforcement because harvesting of wool is a once a year affair taking
place in the spring, so that a delay thereafter makes performance impossible. The
defendant lost on both grounds with arbitraj holding: (a) specification of a
certain trimester in an allocation order has no impact on operative validity for
a full year unless specifically stated in the plan; and (b) the seasonal character
of wool harvesting does not make the performance impossible as long as the pro-
duct itself is not perishable and can easily be stored for many years.",
D. Voluntary Contracting
Regardless of differences concerning the clauses of a contract, assuming
neither potential party expressly refuses to enter into it, their relationship comes
under the heading of voluntary contract. In such case, it is incumbent upon the
seller to prepare a draft of a proposed contract and send it to the beneficiary. 57
The beneficiary has an obligation to sign the draft and return it to the seller
within five days.58 (No extension of such period may be agreed upon.) He must
52. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 9, para. 2.
53. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 9, para. 2.
54. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 13. The term "trimester" as used in Rumanian
law corresponds to the Anglo-American quarterly period.
55. See Dec. PAS 725 of March 13, 1956, [1956] 4 AS 38.
56. See Dec. Arb. CM 261 of Feb. 4, 1957, [1957] 2 AS 68.
57. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, para. 1. On similar obligation under Soviet
law see H. Berman, supra note 29, at 122.
58. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, para. 2.
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do so regardless of whether or not he agrees with the draft. In case of disagree-
ment, however, he must make a notation on the face of the draft: "with reserva-
tion as specified in list of divergences No .... " and, at the same time, forward
to the seller a list of divergences containing all his objections and counterpro-
posals.59 The seller has in turn a five day period during which he may attempt
to negotiate directly. If there is a failure to reach an understanding, the seller
must resort to arbitraj6 0 Regardless of divergences and litigations, as soon as
the draft is signed and returned by the buyer to the seller, a contract has been
concluded and the parties are under a contractual duty to start performance.
Continuing disagreement and litigation does not excuse inaction.01 When pre-
contractual litigation finally eliminates divergences between the parties, and a
decree sets forth the terms of a contract, such decree is in the nature of an
interpretation of the preexisting contract between the parties, rather than an
order to act in one way or another. The solution of arbitraj, being based on the
plan and basic principles of economic policy, both of which are incorporated by
implication into every contract,62 is, in fact, making an interpretation of implied
clauses of the contract.6 3 The difficulty with this approach is in a situation
where both the seller's and the buyer's proposals are perfectly compatible with
plan and policy, such as disputes concerning details. The filling in of disputed
specifications can hardly be said to result from anything expressed or implied in
the contract. This may explain the more realistic view, taken by the Prime
Arbiter of the Soviet Union, leaving to arbitraj to determine case by case at
what point in time a contract was entered into-that is, the choice between the
time the proposed draft was returned or the divergence settled.04 Identical was
the practice of Rumanian arbitraj until 1960, when the Prime Arbiter of
Rumania [hereinafter referred to as PAS] criticized arbitraj for erroneously
applying the law and instructed arbitraj to uniformly consider a contract con-
cluded when the proposed draft was returned and to incorporate retroactively
the solution of the divergence into the contract.65 The position taken by the
PAS in 1960 was not a new one as similar instructions had been issued in 1956
and 1957,60 but arbitraj was reluctant to abide by them until the imperative
instructions accompanied by sharp criticism brought them back to socialist
legality. Interestingly, Soviet writers prefer the Rumanian view to that of their
own Prime Arbiter, which they criticize on the ground that it fails to provide
59. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8 para. 3. The term list of divergence corresponds
to "protocol of disagreements" in Soviet law, see generally H. Berman, supra note 29, at 123.
60. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, para. 5. Under Soviet law the purchaser rather
than the seller has the obligation to resort to arbitraj, see H. Berman, supra note 29, at
123.
61. 11CM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, para. 7.
62. On theory of incorporation see generally supra Part I(D), pp. 383-84.
63. See Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 6, at 220-22.
64. Instr. PA of Dec. 9, 1940 (U.S.S.R.).
65. Instr. PAS 14 of June 18, 1960.
66. Dec. PAS 1336 of July 28, 1956, [1956] 4 AS 38; Instr. PAS 21 of Apr. 11,
1957, in Cul. 242.
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sufficiently definite standards and to recognize that without exception a contract
has been concluded once it has been signed. 67
The departure from traditional contract law with respect to the principle
that acceptance cannot vary the terms of the offer is not an invention of planned
economies. The requirements of a more rapidly moving commercial activity have
long since eroded the old concept, and acceptance of an offer with some additions
even under the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter UCC] does not neces-
sarily prevent the formation of a contract, unless acceptance is expressly and
strictly conditioned by the offer upon the original terms.68 Even to allow silence
to operate as an acceptance of a counterproposal does not seem a strange concept
to a more modem commercial law.69 However, the existence of a post-contractual
relationship, with respect to the very points on which the parties specifically
refused to agree and with respect to which a precontractual litigation is being
conducted, presents considerable conceptual difficulty. It would have been much
easier to say that when agreement cannot be reached arbitration will tell the
parties what to do. However, anything that would make the parties act upon
orders instead of upon the contract of their choice would have a harmful psycho-
logical impact, so that jurists prefer a line of analysis that stresses the role
played by contracts.
The tendency to consider that a contract has been concluded may sometimes
conflict with the policy of having the parties as a matter of practice get in touch,
put things on paper, negotiate, and in the course of their dealings discover
eventual planning errors. An obvious conflict arises in case of the offeree's delay
in returning or failure to return the proposed draft. If within the five day period
provided for the return of the proposed draft,70 the buyer fails to comply with
his legal obligation, one could easily apply the theory that "when there is a duty
to speak silence constitutes acceptance" as a justification for imposing a con-
tractual relationship upon the parties. 71 On the other hand, such analysis would
enable the buyers to refrain from negotiating and would prevent the imposition
of fines for late contracting or noncontracting. Because of this, the majority view
is that silence does not operate as acceptance but that the buyer is guilty of
breach. The most accurate measure of damages being specific performance, the
buyer will be held to the terms of the proposed draft as compensation for his
failure to enter into a contractual relationship. 72 Liability of state enterprises
being predicated upon fault,78 obviously the damages theory cannot apply when
67. M. Zimeleva, U. Serebrovski & Z. Shkundin, Drept Civil Sovietic [Soviet civil law]
171-172 (Buc. 1950); Novitzki & Luntz, supra note 11, at 197.
68. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207(2) (a) [hereinafter cited UCCI.
69. See, e.g., id. § 2-207(2).
70. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, para. 2.
71. The wording of HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, para. 6: "will be deemed
accepted" suggests such a solution. But see D. Florescu & D. Popescu, Arbitrajul de Stat si
Procesul Arbitral in R-P.R. [Arbitraj and arbitral suit in Rumania] 364 (Buc. Ed. Ac.
1960).
72. Accord, I Mat 202; T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 225. Contra, Dec. Arb.
Reg. Ploesti 746 of Aug. 4, 1955, [1955] 2 AS 38.
73. Rum. Civ. Code arts. 1082-83.
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the nonreturn of the proposed draft is due to circumstances beyond the control
of the parties. For such case, the statute being silent, the PAS has given the
seller an election of remedies. First, to petition for enforcement of the proposed
draft. If arbitraj finds that the buyer was at fault, the contract as originally
proposed by the seller will be imposed as damages, and if not at fault, arbitraj
will hold that a contract was concluded when the reply should have reached the
seller and will adjust the divergences between the parties. The second remedy is to
repudiate the contract and to notify the buyer that because of his delay no con-
tractual relation was created. This may be done only if it does not impair the
seller's ability to fulfill his annual plan, such as when sufficient alternative
buyers for the same or similar products are at hand, or when allocation orders
in excess of the production plan have been issued. Failure to be prompt in in-
forming the buyer will not bind the seller to his proposed draft, but will also
force upon him compliance with the late-coming list of divergences, on the
theory that the buyer may be justified in interpreting silence as an acquiescence,
and relying upon it. Assuming the requirement of promptness was complied with,
the buyer still may petition to arbitraj and a decision will be made with due re-
gard to both parties' plan and the state's interest in having the annual plan
fulfilled.74 All of these ancillary compunctions make the choice of the second
remedy highly unlikely. The condition of having at hand an additional buyer
with an allocation order or of having orders in excess of the plan would seem to
entitle the seller to refuse contracting in the first place and would enable him to
defend successfully a suit7 5 without having first to offer a contract and subse-
quently attempt to withdraw it. Because of these possibilites there are no re-
ported cases of successful repudiation by reason of delayed reply and the
election remains a platonic expression of private initiative.
E. Arbitral Contracting
Thus far discussed have been: (a) contracts entered into without the help
of arbitraj, and (b) with the help of arbitraj either adjudicating divergences or
imposing a contract as damages for the defendant's failure to return promptly
the proposed draft-or promptly assert its unwillngness to contract. Regardless
of how much disagreement may be found in the divergences, and regardless of
the fact that the buyer may have agreed only to extremely different terms, with
the existence of a contract based only on the fact that the buyer did not ex-
pressly refuse to enter into any contract at all, the activity of arbitraj is still
considered as merely auxiliary to the voluntary contracting of the parties.
It is only when either the buyer or the seller expressly rejects the invitation
to enter into any kind of contractual relationship that arbitral contracting comes
into play. In contrast with the role played in voluntary contracting, when arbi-
traj either settles divergences on the basis of the plan or makes findings as to the
74. See I Mat. 202-04.
75. HCM 1397 of Aug. 18, 1954, art. 5 (rules of procedure for arbitraj).
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timeliness of notifications and whether or not the delay was due to the fault of
a party, arbitral contracting involves a limited judicial review of the planning
activity in the sense that, if there is contradiction between production plan and
allocation order, arbitraj will invalidate one or the other, totally or partially.76
It often happens that arbitraj does the same type of review when it handles
divergences, because divergences do not necessarily relate only to minor details,
but often involve the partial invalidation of one or both orders.7 However, many
legal consequences depend upon litigation within the framework of a divergence
or that of arbitral contracting. For example, assuming that the beneficiary has
an allocation order for 1,000 widgets, and the manufacturing plant believes it is
under no duty to produce such merchandise or that the orders were given in ex-
cess of the plan, the manufacturing plant may be well advised to make a pro-
posed draft to sell to beneficiary a certain small amount of widgets and let the
beneficiary submit a list of divergences to arbitraj. Similarly, if the beneficiary
does not need the 1,000 gadgets contained in a proposed draft, he would do
better not expressly to refuse to contract but rather to make a divergence upon
the quantity and declare himself willing to buy a small amount. The consequence
of having divergence rather than arbitral contracting is that no late contracting
fines may be imposed if it later turns out that the divergence was wrong. This
is the result of the analysis discussed previously, that a contract is deemed con-
cluded when the draft was returned,78 and the decision upon divergence becomes
retroactively incorporated into the contract79 without entitling the adversary to
late contracting fines or damages. On the other hand, when it comes to late per-
formance of the contract, a divergence, when compared with arbitral contract-
ing, may tend to become a disadvantage because of late performance fines (that
are higher than late contracting fines) 80 to which the parties may be subjected
from an earlier date due to the retroactive incorporation of the divergence into
the contract.
When handling a motion to compel contracting, arbitraj may totally invali-
date an order (allocation or delivery) or it may enforce it partially or totally
and compel the defendant to enter into a contractual relationship.81 When the
second alternative is present, arbitraj may go one step further and make a de-
cision in lieu of contract. Earlier practice gave complete discretion to arbitraj of
which course of action to take.82 However, since 1955, upon the order of the
PAS to avoid the duplication of litigation which results from causing the parties
to litigate divergences separately, and to render decisions in lieu whenever prac-
tical,83 arbitraj has virtually abandoned decisions compelling contracting. Ru-
76. Instr. PAS 6560 of 1953.
77. In a divergence suit see, e.g., Dec. PAS 3114 of Dec. 30, 1965 partially invalidated
a delivery order for 500 sheep and ordered the parties to contract for 200 sheep.
78. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, para. 7.
79. Instr. PAS 14 of June 18, 1960.
80. Customary per diem late contracting fine is 0.10, late performance fine 0.3%.
81. Instr. PAS 6560 of 1953.
82. I Mat. 199.
83. Instr. PAS 1 of Feb. 15, 1955, in Cul. 150.
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manian scholars criticize the new approach for being excessive and formalistic
and would prefer the older practice giving arbitraj discretion. 4 The practice of
Soviet arbitraj, s5 Czechoslovak arbitraj, 86 and Bulgarian arbitraj, 87 are similar
to the current Rumanian practice, in that the decision by arbitraj in a law suit
based on refusal to contract is deemed the contract and the parties are under
an obligation to start performance. On the other hand, the German law contains
provisions similar to the pre-1956 Rumanian practice allowing arbitraj to simply
order that the parties make a contract and let the parties follow through the
entire procedure, including eventual divergences.
88
F. Late Contracting Fines
Late contracting fines are a device to pressure the parties to enter into the con-
tract. They are imposed in the form of an ancilliary relief to a motion to compel
contracting. A separate suit for fines cannot be brought. If the motion to compel
contracting fails because it is too late for the contract to be performed, late
contracting fines cannot be imposed. In a certain sense, they constitute minimum
liquidated damages because they are imposed without proof of actual damages.
Furthermore, plaintiff may prove that his damages are in excess of the fines and
may recover the difference. Moreover, the plaintiff may recover actual damages
for noncontracting, even though his motion to compel contracting and request
for fines were unsuccessful, provided the solution was not prompted by invalidity
of the allocation.8 9 On the other hand, the plaintiff may not waive his right to
late contracting fines; he is under a duty to sue for them and, failing to do so,
arbitraj has the duty to consider the imposition of late contracting fines ex offli-
cio.tO
Rumanian abritraj imposes late contracting fines from the date the buyer
should have returned the seller's proposal with or without divergences, regardless
of whether or not the contracting campaign was still going on. This differs from
the Soviet practice, criticized by scholars,91 of imposing fines from the cutoff date
84. See T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 12, at 284-85; T. Ionascu & E. Barasch,
supra note 6 at 256-57; Constantinescu, Conditiile in Care Hotarirea Arbitrala Tine Loo de
Contract [The prerequisites for arbitral decisions in lieu of contract), [19581 6 AS 38-39; Con-
stantinescu, Contractul Economic .31ijloc de Intarire a Gospodarirli Socialiste [The eco-
nomic contract, a means of strengthening socialist management], [1961) 2 AS 15. BUt see
Statescu, supra note 32, at 136-37.
85. See W. Saliupa & J. Donde, Arbitrajul de Stat in U.R.S.S. [Arbitraj in the U.S.S.R.]
93-94 (Buc. ESPLEJ 1954); Borzova, Practica Arbitrala in Litigfile Nascute ca Urnarca
Sustragerii Dela Incheierea Contractelor de Furnizare Sau Neincheierii Acestora in Termen
[The practice of arbitraj in law suits involving delay in contracting or refusal to make a
delivery contract], [1956) 8 SDS 196.
86. Law of Nov. 8, 1958, § 24(2).
87. Rules Implementing State Arbitraj Law, art. 47.
88. See Ord. St. Arb. Proc., § 36.
89. See Instr. PAS 2926 of Sept. 11, 1952, in Cul. 22; Instr. PAS 22 of Apr. 17,
1957, in Cul. 243; Dec. PAS 605 of March 11, 1957, [19581 2 AS 40-41.
90. Dec. PAS 64 of Jan. 7, 1956, [1957] 4 AS 44.
91. P. Sapkina, Perfectarea Furnizarilor Prin Contracte si Solutionarea Litigiilor Pre-
contractuale [Improvement of deliveries through the use of contracts and solution of pre-
contract disputes] ch. I, § 2 (Moscow 1961); see also Borzova, supra note 85, at 203.
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of the contracting campaign although the parties were under a duty to contract
prior to the cutoff date.
The five day reply periods, 92 the contracting campaign cutoff dates, 93 and
the election to repudiate the contract9 4 would seem to constitute a limitation
upon the time available for entering into a contractual relationship. In practice
they do not really cut off the rights and duties of the parties but merely serve
the same purpose as late performance fines, to force the parties to contract at
an early date.
The explanation for this may be found in the importance for planned
economies of having delivery contracts concluded as early as possible, so that
arbitraj may help the parties iron out all divergences and organize their work
in due time93 and in the even greater importance of having all planned contrac-
tual relationships effectuated. 96 The law puts all possible pressure on state enter-
prises in futherance of early contracting, but carefully safeguards the opportu-
nity to contract at any time during the annual plan when there is still a chance
that the contract will be performed.
III. Fom AND CONTENT
A. In Writing
The only express statutory requirement concerning the form of delivery
contracts, was that provided in legislation prior to [1951] Decree of the Council
of Ministers of Rumania 524, requiring that they be in writing.97 In spite of
the Decree having no express requirement that delivery contracts be in writing,
it has universally been interpreted as implying the written form.98 There is an
identical requirement in the law of all planned economies.9 9 There is more varia-
tion with respect to the implied requirement that the contract be integrated into
a single instrument rather than expressed in an exchange of letters. There is a
split among the writers'00 and the instructions of the PAS are equivocal because
they mention that generally a single instrument will be required without speci-
fying the circumstances under which an exception may be made.-0' Earlier in-
structions of the PAS indicate that contracts made in disregard of the prescribed
form may not be invalidated but that the guilty employee should be subjected to
92. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 8, paras. 2 & 5.
93. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 9.
94. I Mat. 202. See generally supra Part HI(D), pp. 387-90.
95. See Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 12 at 90.
96. See Witzman, Unele Solutii Noi Ale Practicei Arbitrale Din Anvl 1965 [New de-
velopments in the 1965 practice of arbitrajl, [1966] 2 AS 1, 10.
97. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 1.
98. See Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 6, at 274; I Mat. 60-62.
99. See, e.g., Law of Dec. 11, 1957, § 21(1) (Germ.); Hung. Civ. Code art. 399; Law
109 of June 4, 1964, § 152 (Czech. Econ. Code).
100. Accord, Constantinescu, Despre Contractele Reglementate [Regulated contracts],
[1957] 2 AS 20; Witzman, Contributii Ale Practicei Arbitrale la Indeplinirea Sarchnilor
Economice Ale Planulid de Stat [The contribution of arbitraj to the fulfillment of the
economic tasks of the plan], [1960] 5 JN 783, 792. Contra, Ionascu & Barasch, supra
note 6, at 278.
101. See Instr. PAS 6 of June 11, 1958.
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disciplinary action. 0 2 However, it is not clear whether the instructions would
excuse the disregard of the single instrument requirement or only that of minor
forms like standard clauses. On the other hand, arbitraj is reluctant to invali-
date any contract and constantly enforces contracts not meeting the single
instrument requirement. Such practice is in line with that of Soviet arbitraj. 1'
Other planned economies have statutes expressly dispensing with the single
instrument requirement.10 4 On the whole, it does not constitute a serious prob-
lem, so long as the parties exchange letters and do, in fact, deal with the details
involved and have an opportunity to check for eventual planning errors.
B. Preliminary Contracting
A much more important problem and more lively debate concerns the re-
quirement of preliminary contracting (in contrast with concomitant contracting)
with regard to which there has been a constant change in the practice of arbitraj
and the instructions of the PAS. The law prohibits the State Bank and Invest-
ment Bank from making payments on any invoice which is not accompanied by
a certain number of documents, among which must be the preliminary contract
and delivery order? °5 Because most financial accounts of state enterprises are
handled by the State Bank (with the exception of those handled by the Invest-
ment Bank), and payments are made exclusively through banking channels, the
provision amounts to an outlawing of concomitant contracts because negligent
sellers would not be able to collect. There was a loud outcry against the hard-
ship to the negligent seller who must bear the entire loss as compared with the
windfall to the negligent buyer who can keep the merchandise without paying
for it. Arbitraj began to circumvent the law by allowing law suits based on a
theory of unjust enrichment. They directed the State Bank to pay money repre-
senting unjust enrichment to a party rather than representing the purchase
price, although the quantum paid was usually measured by the contract price.
The practice of arbitraj weakened the pressure on state enterprises to make
preliminary contracts and the PAS was soon going to intervene. As a matter of
fact, he answered the criticism of hardship by pointing out that the measure is
in no way different from fines and penalties designed to enforce contractual
discipline. He concluded that there is no reason to feel sorry for delinquent
enterprises. 0 6 As such admonition proved insufficient, the PAS in 1954 issued
specific instructions ratifying the procedure of arbitraj in allowing suits for un-
just enrichment but demanded that arbitraj take an additional step, that of
ordering successful plaintiffs to pay over the award into a special fund of the
Ministry of Finance.10 7 The instructions were designed to maintain pressure on
102. See Instr. PAS 31 of June 17, 1957.
103. See R. Halfina, Rolul si Esenta Contractului in Dreptul Socialist Sovietic [The role
and essence of contract in socialist Soviet civil law] 246 (Buc. ESPLEJ 1956); Novltzki
& Luntz, supra note 11, at 216.
104. See, e.g., Law of Dec. 11, 1957, § 21(1) (Germ.); Hung. Civ. Code art. 399.
105. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 15(c).
106. See I Mat. 305-06.
107. See Instr. PAS 7266 of May 3, 1954.
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the parties and to eliminate the possibility of a windfall to the buyer, who, as a
result, is now under an obligation to pay for the merchandise, in addition to be-
ing subject to disciplinary action. The results were not entirely statisfactory
because sellers having neglected to make an anticipatory contract were dis-
couraged from later fulfilling the planned obligations. They would rather couple
their initial indiscipline with further wrongful inaction, in order to avoid per-
formance for the benefit of the Ministry of Finance. This prompted, in 1957, a
partial withdrawal of the earlier instructions, in the sense that sellers were al-
lowed to retain the payments received for the merchandise if the contract, al-
though concomitant, was otherwise in conformity with the plan. Concomitant
contracts were accorded all the effects of preliminary contracts such as implied
warranties. At the same time, stronger disciplinary measures were implemented
against employees neglecting preliminary contracting. 0 8
C. Contracts with Limited Effects
Only one year later there was a new change, designed to put pressure on
buyers. The effects of concomitant contracts were limited to: (a) the buyer's
right to have the merchandise delivered and (b) the seller's right to have the
price paid for it.10 9 This, in effect, denies to buyers the implied warranties in
case of concomitant contracts. The new treatment remains the law with two
modifications. One deals with accounts handled by the Investment Bank. Under
no circumstances can such payments be based on concomitant contracts or un-
just enrichment.110 The other increases disciplinary liability of employees
neglecting their duties with respect to preliminary contracting.
An interesting application of the new doctrine of contracts with limited
effects came in 1962. In cases of contracts with full effects, it is the constant
practice of arbitraj to protect buyers with an implied warranty against out of
pocket losses due to retroactive price increases. The effect of such a warranty is
to allow intermediaries, who have actually resold merchandise at the old and
lower price, to offset their out of pocket losses against the price difference they
would have to pay to the seller on the basis of the new price. In the case of a
concomitant contract, the seller was allowed to recover from the buyer the
entire price difference without the buyer being allowed to offset the losses in-
curred with respect to the merchandise resold at the old price. The court rea-
soned that allowing the offset would, in fact, amount to a violation of the 1958
instructions denying to concomitant contracts any effects other than delivery
of merchandise and payment, because the offset was not part of the price dif-
ference but an expression of an implied warranty specifically denied by the
instructions.""
The new concept of contracts with limited effects is severely criticized by
108. See Instr. PAS 31 of June 17, 1957.
109. Instr. PAS 6 of June 11, 1958.
110. Joint Instr. PAS & IB 5 of Apr. 15, 1959.
111. Ans. NCA of March 12-13, 1962, [1962] 2 AS 35.
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writers as having no statutory basis and no logical justification. Further, the
authors fail to perceive a reason for treating contracts with payments to be
handled by the Investment Bank, differently than contracts with payments to be
handled by the State Bank. The authors are in disagreement concerning a pos-
sible solution to the problem. Some would give the concomitant contracts un-
limited effects but would penalize the seller by making him pay over to the State
the price received;112 others would deny concomitant contracts all effects what-
soever and treat delivery as if no contract were made between the parties;113
and finally, a third group would treat the contract as if it were a civil contract
for unplanned goods.1" 4 Criticism and controversy notwithstanding, the new type
of contracts has survived.
D. Short Form Contracts
The various Ministries are entitled to waive the requirement of a full-
fledged delivery contract with respect to delivery of small quantities of goods.
Each Ministry may allow delivery of merchandise, by simply issuing a confirma-
tion of the order and without going through the ritual of a proposed draft,
answer, etc. "The order coupled with a confirmation is assimilated to a contract
and will enable the State Bank or Investment Bank respectively to make the
requisite payments. ' s Although the decree uses the words "assimilated to a
contract," arbitraj has constantly interpreted the provision as allowing short
from contracting rather than dispensing with a contract altogether or substitut-
ing orders for a contract. Consequently, all effects of a full-fledged contract
were accorded to the short form contract, with buyers having the benefit of all
express and implied warranties. The PAS, having to decide the legality of the
treatment of short form contracts, in 1954 issued instructions inviting arbitraj
to continue its practice with respect to planned contracts.'" The silence of the
instructions with respect to regulated contracts left part of the question unsettled
until 1960, when a decision of the PAS with respect to an order coupled with a
confirmation treated it as a short form contract and gave it all the effects of a
contract. As the goods involved called not for a planned contract but for a
regulated one, the decision of the PAS settled the entire problem.117
There are two circumstances under which short form contracts may not be
used regardless of the amount of money involved: (a) when there are diver-
gences between the parties with respect to any term,118 and (b) when special or-
ders are involved, calling for manufacture of products which the seller is not ordi-
112. See, e.g., Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 6, at 298.
113. See, e.g., S. Statescu, Arbitrajul de Stat si Practica Arbitrala [Arbitraj and arbitral
practice] 245-46 (Buc. Ed. Parhon 1962).
114. See, e.g., Severin, Zece Ani Dela Inflintarea Arbitrajului de Stat [Ten years since
the organization of arbitrajl, [1959] 3 AS 1, 6.
115. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 12, para. 1.
116. Instr. PAS 7266 of May 3, 1954, in Cul. 111.
117. Dec. PAS 5255 of Oct. 31, 1960, [1961] 1 AS 72.
118. See HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 12, para. 2.
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narily in the practice of keeping in stock or selling.11 9 In both circumstances, the
parties must fulfill the requirements with respect to full fledged contracts. In
contrast to domestic trade, there is no prohibition against the use of short form
contracting in foreign trade regardless of the amount involved.
120
E. Mandatory Clauses
The contracting parties must include in every contract a reference to the
basic conditions of delivery, the state standards applicable and the legal basis for
the contract price, and also state the numbers and dates of allocation orders and
delivery orders on the basis of which the contract is concluded. 121 There are no
legal issues with respect to these requirements other than the result if the parties
omit them. The answer is simple; arbitraj will incorporate them by implication
into the contract. A more complicated problem arises with respect to conven-
tional damages clauses. On the one hand, their inclusion into every delivery
contract is mandatory. 2 2 On the other, the duty to standardize conventional
damages was.delegated to the various Ministries, which were under an obligation
to fix the amount of late performance fines and low quality penalties to be ap-
plied with respect to contracts of subordinate enterprises. 123 The fines and penal-
ties, as fixed by the Ministries, were to become part of the basic conditions of
delivery. Some of the Ministries provided for both fines and penalties, others
for penalties but not for fines, and still others for fines and not for penalties.
Thus the basic conditions of delivery varied in this respect from industry to
industry. The question arose whether, in case of basic conditions making no
provision with respect to penalties, the parties to the contract should include
them because they are mandatory under the law or should refrain from includ-
ing them because the question has been delegated to the Ministries, preempting
the right of the parties to deal with the problem. The PAS has chosen the
second alternative. 2 4 The solution was criticized as allowing the silence of an
inferior body, the Ministry, to override the express command of a superior body,
the Counsel of Ministers, which issued the decree.' 25
F. Prohibited Clauses
1. Affecting Duration of the Contract
Most allocation orders and delivery orders have operative validity until the
end of the year.126 At that time the annual plan terminates and all unfulfilled
119. See HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 15(c), para. 3.
120. Paltineanu & Puscasiu, Unele Aspecte Juridice Ale Relatiilor Contractuale Privind
Comertld Exterior [Some legal aspects of contractual relations in foreign trade], [1962] 5
AS 32, 34-35.
121. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 2.
122. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 2(k); HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 2(b).
For a similar requirement in the Soviet Union, see H. Berman, supra note 29, at 132.
123. See HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 14(a).
124. See Instr. PAS 3 of Jan. 21, 1956.
125. See T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 236.
126. See HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 9, para. 1.
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orders expire, or to be more technical, lose their operative validity. The parties
may not derogate from the operative validity by providing that the contract may
be canceled during the year and may not authorize delivery in a subsequent
year because this would implicitly affect the duration of the contract.12
What the parties may not anticipate in their contract arbitraj may later
achieve indirectly. For instance, arbitraj may authorize a repudiation of the
contract prior to the expiration of the year if, as a result of the seller's delay,
the goods have become unusable to the purchaser.128 Conversely, arbitraj may
compel a beneficiary not to reject goods delivered during a subsequent calendar
year by virtue of the right to cure the defects of a prior attempted delivery or
by imputing the performance to a future allocation order.120 In either case,
arbitraj bases his action on considerations existing at the time of the law suit
without contractual provisions anticipating those contingencies.
In this respect, Soviet law is more flexible, allowing contractual arrange-
ments for repudiation of the contract independently from operative validity.'"
But also in Soviet law such arrangements may be subject to invalidation by the
courts if contrary to national economic planning acts.1381 Operative validity being
regulated by national economic planning acts, it may well be that any contrac-
tual termination of an obligation prior to the expiration of operative validity
may be thrown out by arbitraj.
Hungarian legislation is similar to that of the Soviet Union authorizing
contractual arrangements concerning the duration of delivery contracts.8 2
2. Affecting Mode of Payment or Credit
No contractual arrangement is authorized with respect to mode of payment
or extension of credit. The parties cannot stipulate for prepayment or a down-
payment of any sum of money, nor can they extend credit for any length of
time. 8 3 The law takes care of all these problems by directing the State Bank or
Investment Bank to transfer to the account of seller from that of the purchasing
enterprise the sum of money representing the price of the delivered merchan-
dise. 34 For that purpose the seller must prove to the Bank that the delivery order
and allocation orders exist, that a contract has been concluded, and that the
merchandise has been accepted by the common carrier for shipment.8 8 The
activity of the State Bank (or Investment Bank) may be compared to that of
127. See HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 10, para. 2; Dec. Arb. Reg. Brasov 1302 of
May 20, 1966, [1966] 5 AS 101.
128. See Instr. PAS 2014 of March 11, 1953, in Cul. 30; Dec. PAS 1410 of May 20,
1957.
129. See I Mat. 233-34.
130. R.S.F.S.R. Civ. Code art. 225, para. 2, 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2, at 16 (U.S.S.R.
1964).
131. R.S.F.S.R. Civ. Code art. 233, para. 2, 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2, at 17 (U.S.S.R.
1964).
132. See Hung. Civ. Code art. 400(2).
133. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949, arts. 3, 9, para. 2.
134. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 13.
135. See D. 404 of Sept. 23, 1955; Instr. BS 10 of Apr. 25, 1955.
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American Banks handling documentary letters of credit, in so far as they trans-
fer funds on the basis of documents without regard to existing controversies
between the parties.
Also under Soviet law, credit relations between state enterprises and pay-
ments, being subject to central regulation by the U.S.S.R. council of ministers,
are excluded from contractual arrangements. 3 6 Similar treatment of credit
relations may be found in the law of other planned economies as well.18 7
A justification for such a high degree of centralization may be found in the
great importance given to centralized credit by Rumanian economists: "Credit
is the highest form of mobilizing and allocating financial resources of enterprises,
of the population and the budget in order to provide for the needs of production
and distribution in accordance with state planning."' 38 Because of the forego-
ing, commerical credit had to be abolished and credit is now handled exclusively
by banks guided by the objectives of the economic plan. 39
There are two exceptions to the law prohibiting state enterprises from
demanding advance payments. One relates to certain construction contracts'4"
and the other to certain contracts involving farm products. 4 1 In both cases,
sellers are authorized to demand downpayments in accordance with the basic
conditions of delivery if the conditions provide such a clause. There is no excep-
tion authorizing credit.
3. Requiring Performance Bonds or Deposits
There are no statutory provisions oitlawing performance bonds or deposits
of a sum of money in order to insure the performance of an obligation. On the
contrary, it was popular for Ministries to provide in their basic conditions of
delivery, that bonds be posted or money be deposited to insure a timely return
of containers by the purchaser. But the PAS invalidated these arrangements
and ordered the Ministries to refrain from such provisions in the basic conditions
of delivery.' 42 The PAS thought that performance bonds and money deposits
impinge upon the credit system in that they immobilize funds and that there exist
more efficient arrangements which can be used in order to achieve the desired
promptness in return of containers. As ministries and state enterprises promptly
realized what the PAS was suggesting, it became a standard practice to sell and
resell containers and to insure a prompt resale and redelivery of containers, by set-
ting stiff late performance fines in the basic conditions and the delivery contracts.
136. See R.S.F.S.R. Civ. Code arts. 391-92, 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2, at 22 (U.S.S.R.
1964): "All financial dealings of 100 (new) rubles or more must be handled by the banks, a
central clearing house is provided for all commercial transactions and the entire system
operates on the basis of bookkeeping deductions." H. Bermani supra note 29, at 143.
137. See, e.g., Hung. Civ. Code art. 200(3).
138, A. Vijoli, Organizarea Finantarii, Oreditarii si Decontarilor in R.P.R. [The organiza-
tion of financing, credit and clearing in Rumania] 26-27 (Buc. 1962).
139. Id. at 30.
140. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 3, para. 2.
141. See id. art. 3, para. 3.
142. See I Mat. 259-61.
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Later, a special decree dealing with containers and packaging again raised the
issue of deposits and performance bonds by providing that contracts may contain
such clauses if authorized by law.' 43 No authorizing statute was enacted and
probably none will follow because the sale and resale technique proves satis-
factory to cope with the problem.144
Again, Soviet law is less restrictive and allows for the inclusion of clauses
requiring performance bonds (pledge) .14
4. Providing for Joint Liability or Suretyship
The reasons for outlawing joint liability and suretyship are similar to those
which have prompted the outlawing of deposits: their effect upon the credit
system. While no express statutory prohibitions are in effect, the PAS held that:
When one of the joint debtors pays more than his share or when the
surety rather than the principal debtor makes the payment, what in
effect takes place is an extension of credit by one joint debtor to the
other or by the surety to the principal debtor ....
Postponement of payment until the time when the right to con-
tribution or the right of regress is finally enforced for all practical pur-
poses is similar to commercial credit and likewise has no place in our
system of centralized bankcredit and should not appear in economic
contracts.1
46
The situation in Soviet law differs with respect to suretyship which can be
utilized by state enterprises to secure performance of obligations and with re-
spect to negotiable instruments where joint liability of state enterprises is per-
mitted. Otherwise, "joint liability, occurring frequently in contracts between
citizens has no economic justification in relations between state enterprises."14 7
In Czechoslovakia, what is called joint obligation is not really joint because " ...
the contract shall specify the shares or shall state which of the organizations
and by what time shall determine the shares; otherwise such contract shall not
be valid .... ",148
5. Authorizing the Merchandise to Remain in Seller's Custody
It was a widespread practice in the Soviet Union to disguise delay in per-
formance of a planned task in the form of an agreement providing for continuous
custody by the seller of merchandise that in fact has not yet been produced. The
purpose of the practice was to forestall the expiration of delivery orders and
evade banking regulations prohibiting advance payments. Because of the high
143. HCM 869 of May 21, 1955.
144. See A. Vijoli, supra note 138, at 120.
145. Art. 35 of Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics,
in Soviet Civil Legislation and Procedure 74, (Moscow For. Lang. Pub]. House 1962).
146. I Mat. 258-60.
147. Ghenchin, supra note 26, at ch. XXI, § 2; Art. 35 of Fundamentals of Civil
Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics, supra note 145, at 74.
148. Law 109 of June 4, 1964, § 155 (Czech. Econ. Code).
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potential for abuses, Soviet arbitraj outlawed custody arrangements as early as
1934.149
Rumanian arbitraj, having the benefit of Soviet experience, has carefully
circumscribed the use of custody arrangements.150 Merchandise can be left in
the custody of the seller only in emergency situations such as inadequate storage
facilities at the purchaser enterprise, when specifically enumerated in the basic
conditions of delivery, and preceded by a Ministerial verification. 151 In one
case, arbitraj proved lenient and waived the requirement of a specific provision
in the basic conditions of delivery and preliminary Ministerial verification, and
agreed to enforce a custody agreement upon satisfactory proof that the buyer
was a newly formed corporation with inadequate storage facilities. 52 There is
no reason to believe that arbitraj would follow the precedent in future cases pre-
senting the same issue. It is more likely that the judicially created prohibition
will be enforced literally in the future with the very lenient decision of arbitraj
standing as an exception to the rule.153
6. Increasing or Decreasing Liability for Breach
The wording of the statute would seem to prohibit the contractual elimina-
tion of liability for breach but to allow the limitation of such liability: "Basic
conditions of delivery and contracts may not provide clauses contrary to decrees
or statutes, clauses excusing the enterprise from the consequences of a breach
of contract."'154 A narrow interpretation would uphold agreements merely modi-
fying liability either by partially limiting it or by increasing it to the level of
strict liability. A contrary interpretation was adopted by the PAS. Citing as
authority the theories of Novitzki and Luntz, the PAS ordered the invalidation
of any contractual modification of liability for breach. The basis was that
limited liability is an excuse pro tanto expressly prohibited by the statute while
strict liability constitutes an insurance clause, in violation of the insurance
monopoly granted by statute 55 to the State Insurance Administration. 50
While the sweeping prohibition against any contractual modification of
liability for breach is widely acclamied by Rumanian jurists as well as those of
other planned economies,' 57 the grounds relied upon by the PAS are criticized
and alternative jurstifications are offered, such as the superimposition of civil
149. A. Sbkundin, Obligatia de Furnizare a Marfurilor in Dreptul Sovietic [The duty to
deliver goods under Soviet law] (Moscow 1948) ch. III S.3, citing Instr. Arb. U.S.S.R. of
Dec. 14, 1934, and Instr. Arb. U.S.S.R. of Jan. 15, 1936.
150. Custody arrangements are expressly authorized by HCM 524 of June 23, 1951,
art. 2, para. 1.
151. I Mat. 27.
152. See Dec. Arb. Reg. Dobrogea 1407, [1961] 5 AS 36 (1960).
153. See T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 356.
154. HCM 524 of June 23, 1954, art. 2, para. 5.
155. See D. 38 of Feb. 6, 1952, art. 2, para. 2.
156. See I Mat. 256-58.
157.' See T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 366; Pflicke, Grindsatze der Varant-
wortlichkeit (Principles of liability], in Grundfragen des Vertragssystem 84 (Berlin 1958)
-
Vasiliev, Drept Civil al RI'. Bulgaria [Civil law of Bulgaria] ch. XII, § 14 (Sofia 1956).
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and administrative duties; the latter, having identical object with the former,
fixes its limits and prevents contractual modification.'"
G. Conclusion
An analysis of various requirements with respect to form and content dis-
closes a conflict between two policies.
On the one hand, it is desirable to have the parties actively participate in
the conclusion of the contract and, in fact, work out some details and deepen the
plan because it relieves the planners from overly detailed planning and provides
the parties with more incentive to work. There is a well known reluctance to act
merely as an executioner of commands coming from above.
On the other hand, planning discipline is equally desirable because the en-
terprises cannot be as familiar with economic policies as are the planners, and are
less trustworthy because of the selfish interest of management in complying with
success indicators without regard to the real interests of the economy.
It appears that at present the second policy prevails over the first and the
contribution of the parties to the contract is often disregarded for the sake of a
more effective discipline and for the prevention of dishonesty.
IV. TOTAL AND PARTIAL INvALIDITY OF DELIVERY CONTRACTS
A. Introduction
Planned economy states handle the problem of invalidity in a manner
totally distinct from traditional contract law.
The latter differentiates between absolutely void contracts that may be
judicially declared as such at the request of any interested person and relatively
void or voidable contracts that may be invalidated only at the request of one of
the contracting parties. Traditional contract law further divides the second
group into totally voidable contracts, and partially voidable contracts containing
one or more invalid clauses that, short of destroying the entire contract, will be
severed by the court and disregarded.
Planned economies, as a general rule, do not classify contracts into abso-
lutely void and relatively void because in every case any interested person or
authority may seek the invalidation of any contract. At the same time, total in-
validations are rarely sought. The usual case is a suit involving the invalidation
of one or more clauses. A simple disregard of the invalid clauses is equally
unlikely. The practice of arbitraj is to rewrite the invalid clause so as to make
it legal.
B. Total Invalidity
Under Rumanian law, there is only one ground resulting in total invalidity,
that of lack of a valid allocation and/or delivery order. No express statutory
158. See T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 366.
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provision so provides but it is generally believed that it is implicit in the ration-
ale of art. 34, pars. 1-2 of D. 31 of Jan. 30, 1954.119
Soviet arbitraj has the same practice of rewriting invalid clauses rather
than throwing out the invalid clauses or the entire contract.160
In the early days of planning, there were more instances of contracting
without the requisite allocation followed by an invalidation by arbitraj or the
PAS. 161 An invalidation by the PAS, ordered on June 10, 1958, prompted the
issuance of instructions the next day to the effect that contracts made by parties
not in possession of legal allocation and/or delivery orders be invalidated and the
violation brought promptly to the knowledge of the interested Ministries for
proceedings against the guilty persons. The PAS further ordered that the mer-
chandise be returned and payments refunded. If restitution were to prove im-
possible, a monetary equivalent was suggested.1 6 2
The instructions contain two ambiguities. One is the requirement of allo-
cation orders in possession of contracting parties at the time of contracting. A
literal interpretation would call for an invalidation of contracts concluded while
allocation orders were in the mails and would prevent a Ministry from ratifying
a contract by subsequently issuing allocation orders. It would constitute a depar-
ture from the earlier PAS position stating that:
invalidity is no purpose per se, when its prerequisites disappear it
should never be declared. It exists in order to help the fulfillment of the
plan but saving contracts serves the same purpose. A contract null
initially with the reasons of its nullity having disappeared prior to a
judicial determination of the issue should never be invalidated because
it Would be meaningless formalism to make the parties conclilde a new
agreement instead of saving the old one.1 6 3
No ratification by subsequently issued allocation order has occurred since the
new instructions, but it appears to be a matter of careless drafting rather than
an intention to change the earlier position.
The other ambiguity is the requirement of legal allocation orders. Without
going into the mechanics of planning it should be emphasized that ministries do
not have a free hand in allocating goods and orders may turn out to be illegal
for several reasons. One possible interpretation would allow abitraj to scrutinize
the legality of allocation orders and invalidate contracts made in reliance on
such orders. This is the interpretation suggested by some scholars16Y 4 relying upon
a similar solution in Soviet law.165 Another possible interpretation would deny
159. See S. Statescu, supra note 113, at 250-52; Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 6, at 385.
160. 0. Ioffe, Drept Civil Sovietic [Soviet civil law] 84 (Buc. Ed. St. 1960). But see H.
Berman, supra note 29, at 141.
161. See, e.g., Dec. Arb. Reg. Buc. 538 of June 1, 1956, [1956] 5 AS 53; Dec. Arb.
Reg. Buc. 410 of July 13, 1956, [1956] 5 AS 53; Dec. Arb. Reg. Galati 140 of Feb. 20,
1957, [1957] 5-6 AS 91; Dec. PAS 1424 of June 10, 1958, [1958] 6 AS 54.
162. See Dec. PAS 1827 of June 10, 1958, [1958] 6 AS 54; Instr. PAS 6 of June 11,
1958, [1958] 4 AS 31.
163. I Mat. 270.
164. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 388.
165. 0. Moffe, Raspunderea in Dreptul CiWil Sovietic [Liability in Soviet civil law] 102
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arbitraj the right to pass upon the validity of allocation orders. Among the au-
thors embracing this interpretation is M. Witzmann, who has suggested in law
review articles that legal allocations mean requisite allocation orders and that
contracts would be safe from judicial invalidation once the parties are in posses-
sion of allocation orders prima facie valid.1 66 The personality of Mr. Witzmann,
a distinguished lawyer and law professor, and moreover his position as a PAS,
give his view expressed in a private capacity much weight, so it is not surprising
that arbitraj adopted the practice of referring all cases involving illegal alloca-
tion orders to the competent Ministry.
An intensive, permanent and concurrent control by the various ministries,
and the State Bank1 67 prevents the problem from becoming acute. The context
in which the violation sometimes occurs is that of an "expired" order. While in
theory an expired allocation order is no allocation order at all so that the goods
would have to be returned and payments refunded, arbitraj is reluctant to disre-
gard it completely and to order restitution. Rather, it prefers to impute per-
formance upon a future delivery order and allows the parties to keep the mer-
chandise and the money.168 The reluctance of arbitraj is especially justified in
cases where restitution would upset the current plan of the beneficiary and in
cases of a relatively short period of delay. Another technique used by arbitraj
is its willingness to hold that performance took place at an earlier date and that
the seller was merely "curing" the defects of the earlier performance. 0 0
C. Partial Invalidity
Any illegality other than lack of an allocation order constitutes grounds for
partial invalidity of the contract. In traditional contract law, invalid clauses
would result in the entire contract being declared illegal unless they were con-
sidered not essential to the contract, in which case they would be merely severed
and ignored. Although all clauses are essential in delivery contracts, the validity
of the contracts is not affected by the illegality of one or more clauses, because
conceptually the contract initially incorporates by implication the plan and basic
economic policies of the state. 70 In theory, what arbitraj does is merely to inter-
pret a contract having two sets of conflicting clauses, one set express and illegal,
the other set implied and legal. As a result of the interpretation, a real and
(Buc. Ed. St. 1956); I. Novitzki, Actele Juridice-Prescroptia Actiunei [Legal documents-
statute limitations] 93 (Buc. ESLEJ 1956).
166. See Witzman, supra note 100, at 793; Witzman, Lupta Arbitrajuli de Stat Pentru
Apararea Proprietatil Socialiste [The struggle of arbitraj in defending socialist property],
[1958] 3 AS 5.
167. See, e.g., D. 154 of Sept. 28, 1951 (coordination of control) ; H M 1934 of Dec.
19, 1957 (internal control) ; Reg. to HCM 74 of Jan. 23, 1959 (preventive control) ; Instr.
HCM 34 of Jan. 15, 1959 (sanctions for financial indiscipline); Reg. to HCM 1254 of Sept.
24, 1958 (penalties for inadequate documentation of banking transactions); HCM 513 of
Apr. 29, 1959 (revision and control by MF).
168. See, e.g., Dec. PAS 725 of March 13, 1956, [1956] 4 AS 38.
169. Instr. PAS 4542 of March 20, 1954, in Cul. 95-96. See generally infra Part VII(B),
pp. 426-28.
170. See Law 5 of Aug. 5, 1954, art. 24. See generally supra Part I(E), pp. 384-85.
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complete version of the contract will be ascertained by the court, with the
implied legal clauses in place of the illegal ones.
Also, neither the statute nor arbitraj use the terms "invalidation" or "re-
writing" with respect to the activity described above. The statute deals with
"arbitral modification of clauses found inconsistent with statutes or other
norms.' 171 The PAS suggests "adaptation by arbitraj of the contract' 1 72 and calls
it "updating the contract to conform it to the requirements of the plan."'17a By
whatever name it is called, it is, in fact, a rewriting of illegal clauses. Its effects
are retroactive and performance and payments made under the old version may
be subjected to restitution and refund.
Some authors suggest that updating would be possible in exceptional cir-
cumstances by simply eliminating the illegal clause without replacing it with a
pre-established norm. The example given is that of a requirement for a downpay-
ment which could simply be ignored by the interpreting court. 74 However, arbi-
traj did not abide by the suggestion and continues in all cases not only to elimi-
nate the invalid clauses, but also to replace them. An illustration of the standard
practice in this respect is the following: A contract gives the seller an election
between two alternative courses of action in case of the buyer's failure to make
the timely reception of goods. He could either make the reception himself, and
proceed with the shipping of the goods, a practice called delivery with autore-
ception and which is mandatory, or he could continue to keep the goods in his
custody, a practice which is illegal. The PAS not only eliminated the second
alternative from the contract, but replaced it with the provision from the basic
conditions of delivery stating that delivery with autoreception is mandatory for
all contracts. 75 An explanation for the additional work performed by arbitraj
in replacing the illegal clauses when it could have simply ousted them may be
found in what is commonly referred to as the "educational role" of arbitraj, that
of teaching the parties how to draft their contract. It should be repeated that
the above constitutes, in theory, an interpretation by arbitraj of the contract,
"arbitraj orders nothing, it merely ascertains the content of the contract.' 1Th
The statute also contains a provision dealing with a situation in which arbi-
traj is unable to ascertain the content of a contract because of the interrelation
of the invalid clauses with the rest of the contract. In such a case, arbitraj is
authorized to make a finding that no contract exists.' 77 At first glance, it would
seem that the illegality of one or more clauses could lead to a complete invalida-
tion of the contract if such clauses are essential to the contract and the rest of
the contract is directly related to the invalid clause. The interpretation by the
PAS is different:
171. Id. art. 25.
172. I Mat. 264.
173. Dec. Arb. CM 2942 of June 29, 1961.
174. See T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 400.
175. See Dec. PAS 1562 of May 31, 1957, [1958) 2 AS 42.
176. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 6, at 407.
177. Law 5 of Aug. 5, 1954, art. 25, para. 21.
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atbitraj will proceed with the adaptation of the contract even though the
parties would prefer to abstain from the contract as adapted. Only an
objective cause, such as impossibility of performance of the adapted
contract, can justify a finding by arbitraj that no contract exists.178
In the interpretation of the PAS, the existence of an illegal clause or its interrela-
tion with the rest of the contract becomes meaningless because objective causes
such as impossibility of performance constitute independent grounds for excus-
ing the parties from entering into a contractual relationship.
D. Conclusion
The substantive provisions dealing with invalidity demonstrate a strong
policy against invalidation of delivery contracts. An enterprise once bound by a
contract has very little chance of completely avoiding the contracutual relation-
ship. The essential clauses of the contract may have to be rewritten or the prices
changed, but nevertheless, an uninterrupted continuous relationship exists.
The procedure exemplifies a policy of complete distrust of the parties, once
they have made the mistake of entering into an agreement with an illegal clause.
It is the judge who rewrites the contract and does it without regard to the wishes
of the parties.
Finally, the theoretical justification suggests a policy of maintaining the
appearance of a consensual relationship at all stages, with as little administrative
interference as possible. That is, the state enterprises and they alone, are the
authors of the contract, including the judical version thereof, the contribution of
arbitraj being merely incidental-that of interpreting what the parties have im-
plied to begin with.
V. MODIFICATION OF DELIVERY CONTRACTS
A. Consensual Modifications
In traditional contract law, a consensual modification of a pre-existing con-
tract is generally possible. The Anglo-American concept of consideration, which
may sometimes prevent the enforceability of a modifying agreement unless separ-
ate consideration can be shown, constitutes an exception to the rule. Even that
exception has lost its importance. Under more modern legislation in the United
States, in a commercial context, the parties no longer have to worry about
consideration when they modify their contract.1 79 Therefore the general rule is
that there is as much freedom with respect to modification as there is with re-
spect to initial contracting. The same rule prevails in the Rumanian Civil
Code. 80
With respect to state enterprises, it is only natural that a legal system
severely limiting and regulating initial contracting will also circumscribe modifi-
178. I Mat. 265-66.
179. See UCC § 2-209(1).
180. Rum. Civ. Code art. 969, para. 2.
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cation contracts.181 However, in areas in which the parties are more or less free
initially to make a contractual arrangement, one would expect that they will
subsequently be able to agree upon a modification, and conversely, with respect
to matters prohibited initially, one would suppose that the parties will have to
refrain from modification as well.
Interestingly, the parties to a delivery contract may have either more or
less freedom of action at the time they negotiate a modification, as compared to
the time they first made the contract. On the one hand, a matter from which the
parties cannot depart in their initial contract is the quantum of merchandise to
be delivered, as specified in the allocation order. When they first contract, they
must do so to the full extent of the allocation order. An agreement for a smaller
quantity is illegal, even though the buyer may prove that he does not need the
goods and has so notified the Ministry.182 Subsequently, when it comes to a
modification, the parties may be in a position where the law allows them to re-
duce the quantity to be delivered under the contract to a figure lower than that
specified in the allocation order. This happens when, due to technological
changes, the buyer is capable of fulfilling his plan by using a smaller quantity
of goods, and the seller at the same time is capable of fulfilling his plan in spite
of the reduction, e.g., by overfulfilling his export commitments. When both con-
ditions are met, the parties may make the modifying agreement without violat-
ing the law.183 On the other hand, a matter which the parties may initially make
an arrangement by consent is the delivery date. When they first contract, they
are bound only by the trimester specified in the delivery order and are free to
set the date anywhere between the first and the last day of that trimester. Subse-
quently, relative to modification, the parties may accelerate the delivery date
but they may not postpone it because arbitraj has interpreted such a postpone-
ment as a waiver of the buyer's non-waivable right to late performance penal-
ties.18 4
B. Modifications Caused by Planning Changes
In traditional contract law, the parties may rely on the final version of
their agreement as constituting the law of the parties. 8 5 No such reliance is
justified with respect to delivery contracts, because, as a matter of law, they are
always subject to modifications by virtue of planning changes. Even executed
contracts may be retroactively modified and restitution ordered. Only at the
end of the plan (December 31) can state enterprises be certain that the con-
tracts as concluded or performed will not be subjected to any modification by
virtue of an overhaul of the plan.
The modifications caused by planning changes are far more numerous and
181. See HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, arts. 10(a), (b).
182. Dec. PAS 1471 of June 11, 1966, [1966] 4 AS 115-16.
183. See Dec. Arb. Reg. Iasi 76 of Jan. 27, 1966, [1966] 4 AS 93-94.
184. Dec. Arb. Reg. Cluj 833 of May 31, 1966, [1966] 5 AS 107.
185. See, e.g., Rum. Civ. Code art. 969, para. 1.
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important than the consensual changes. In addition, they present more difficult
legal and technical problems and thus have received more extensive treatment
by the PAS and scholars.
The PAS enumerates the following circumstances, all of which are planning
changes, in which a contract will be considered modified:
(a) The replacement of the state enterprise under a duty to fulfill a plan-
ned task with another enterprise;
(b) replacement of the object of the planned task;
(c) imposition of a new date for the fulfillment of the task;
(d) increase or decrease of the planned task;
(e) order for cancellation: and
(f) order for discontinuation. 8 6
The first two circumstances eliminate the effects of the initial contract and
call for the conclusion of a new one. This is referred to as the extinguishing
and creative effect of planning changes. There is a new administrative and civil
duty imposed upon the parties to contract with each other, and at the same time,
there is again an opportunity for precontractual litigation with respect to diver-
gences.18 7 The other four circumstances have absolutely no existing or creative
effect. Consequently, no new contracts will be entered into, nor will precontrac-
tual litigation take place, but the parties may litigate the interpretation of the
modified portion of their contract.1s s
A typical example of planning changes affecting delivery contracts can be
found in the 1961 joint instructions of the PAS and the State Planning Com-
mittee of Rumania [hereinafter CSP] with respect to the impending overhaul of
the 1962 Plan subsequent to the termination of the contracting campaign for
1962:
When the overhaul of the 1962 State Plan will result in modifi-
cation of allocation orders, the Ministries and other central organs in
collaboration with local authorities will modify the schedules and within
5 days notify the enterprises with respect to the modifications of allo-
cations.
In case of a change in parties or replacement of the object of the
allocation the notified parties will proceed to the conclusion of new
contracts. In case of a change concerning the quantity or delivery
schedule without replacing the parties or changing the object of the
contract, the existing delivery contracts will be adapted in order to
conform to the planning changes. The adaptation will be contained in a
separate writing. Disputes concerning the interpretation of modifica-
tions caused by changes in allocations may be submitted to arbi-
traj .... 189
186. II Mat. 420, 446, 449.
187. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, Teoria Generala a Contractelor Economice II [General
theory of economic contracts II] 40-64 (Buc. Ed. Ac. 1965).
188. Id. at 62-63.
189. joint Instr. PAS & CSP 18 of Oct. 20, 1961.
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While these instructions were designed to deal with only the 1962 overhaul,
they are illustrative of a general pattern followed in all cases of systematic
planning changes.
A more difficult legal problem is presented when isolated planning changes
occur, and the planning authorities do not follow through with correlative ad-
justments. Because consumption is almost completely planned, the reduction of
one order necessarily causes a chain reaction and affects the plans of other enter-
prises as well. The plant, whose allocation orders for raw materials has been
curtailed, will in turn fail to satisfy all its customers and will breach some of its
delivery contracts unless it plan is also decreased and its contracts implicitly
modified. These forced breaches caused by isolated planning changes are com-
monly referred to as the indirect influence of planning changes, the consensus
being that they are excusable.' 90
The isolated planning changes present two delicate problems. The first is
the difficulty of arbitraj tracing every breach, and the likelihood that state enter-
prises will attempt to defend on the grounds of indirect influence somewhere
along the line. It should be remembered that a breach by a state enterprise's
supplier is no excuse for its own subsequent breach, unless due to planning
changes. The second problem is the undesirability of perrditting state enterprises
to determine priorities among customers by allowing them to elect the contracts
to be fulfilled and those to be breached, when planning changes make it impos-
sible to fulfill them all.
The laws of Germany' 91 and Hungary' 92 contain a partial solution to the
problem. They withhold from the state enterprises any discretion in case of
isolated planning changes, and direct them to reduce proportionately the de-
liveries to all customers unless the Ministries dispose otherwise. In contrast,
Rumanian law makes no provision, but the PAS 'directs state enterprises to
immediately notify the central authorities and request that adjustments be
made, 93 and the Joint Instructions of the PAS and the CSP 194 contain elaborate
and speedy procedures to be followed by central and local authorities, with re-
spect to correlative adjustments, which have the effect of converting isolated
planning changes into a systematic overhaul. The instructions has succeeded in
eliminating many of the problems inherent in chain reactions caused by isolated
changes.
When changes take place, the directly affected enterprise is under no obli-
gation to petition for a decree modifying the initial contract; nor is a writing
signed by both parties necessary. The only requirement is notification to the
190. Zamengov, Imbinarea Conducerii Planificate de Stat cu Independenta Economica
in Raporturile Contractuale [The combination of state planned management with economic
independence in contractual relations], [1963] 3 An. Rom. Soy. Dr. 40; Dec. PAS 2469 of
Sept. 30, 1966, [1966] 6 AS 79.
191. Law of Dec. 11, 1957, § 84.
192. D. CM 50 of 1955, art. 13(4).
193. II Mat. 439.
194. Joint Instr. PAS & CSP 22 of Dec. 25, 1961, [1962] 1 AS 40.
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other party with respect to the modification. This is a judicially created require-
ment, based on the principles of comradely attitude, collaboration and mitiga-
tion of damages. Failure to obtain a prompt notification may entitle the inno-
cent party to recover damages, but will not prevent the automatic modification
of the contract so long as "it is against the interests of the national economy to
compel the purchase of goods that have become unnecessary by virtue of the
planning change."'195
C. Damages Caused by Planning Changes
"A problem arises with respect to allocation of expenses incurred by one of
the parties prior to the cancellation of its tasks by the planning authorities.
Should it be reimbursed for such expenses (the principle of compensation) or
should it bear the expenses (the principle of localization) ?"'Do Soviet scholars
have passionately debated the question and drawn conflicting conclusions. The
supporters of the compensation principle are headed by Askenazi, the expo-
nents of the localization principle are under the leadership of Amfiteatrov and
Venehdiktov. Ioffe takes an eclectic approach advocating that the localization
principle be applied in cases in which both parties are subordinate to the same
authority, and the cohipensation principle when the parties are subordinates of
different authorities. 97 After some initial indecision, Soviet arbitraj adopted the
principle of localization. 98
Rumanian law, like Soviet law, is silent on how damages caused by planning
changes ought to be born. On the other hand, scholars and arbitraj have not even
considered the possibility of any solution to the problem other than the princi-
ple of localization, a principle that has been applied constantly ovor the years,10 9
and invariably praised by scholars.200
D. Conclusion
On the whole state enterprises have a very limited role in the case of
planning changes. The chain reaction set in motion by an isolated change calls
upon central and local authorities to make correlative adjustments without re-
quiring from the state enterprises anything other than notification. The law
probably could establish guidelines and enable state enterprises to participate
in the process by determining priorities among customers. Such a decentrali-
zation would not be revolutionary so long as state enterprises make the same
kind of determination when their inability to fulfill all orders is caused by other
195. Dec. PAS 3184 of Oct. 8, 1962, [19621 3 AS 71.
196. 0. Ioffe, supra note 160, at 455.
197. 0. loffe, supra note 165, at 123; Ioffe, supra note 160, at 456-57.
198. 0. Ioffe, supra note 160, at 456.
199. See, e.g., Dec. Arb. MIG 1574 of Sept. 16, 1957, [19581 5 AS 57-58; Dec. PAS
3184 of Oct. 8, 1962, [1963] 3 AS 70-71.
200. Starc, Annot., [19581 5 AS 58-60; Witzman, Annot, [1961) 6 JN 29; Manolescu,
Consecntele Reziierii Contrachlui de Antrepriza ca Urmare a Modificarli Sarcinilor de Plan,
Localizarea prejudidului? [The consequences of cancellation of an entrepreneurial contract
because of planning changes, who bears the losses?] [19641 1 AS 21-23.
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than planning changes. Moreover, such a participation has the psycological
advantage of a conscientious involvement in the planning process of otherwise
passive state enterprises. It has not been done, and the reasons are probably the
difficulty of giving adequate guidelines and the feeling that it is more prudent to
contralize decision-making in such touchy areas.
While state enterprises are relegated to passivity with respect to planning
changes, arbitraj has chosen for itself a passive role limited to notificatioi with
respect to illegal allocation orders. The law is silent concerning the procedure to
be followed and what it does is to order arbitraj to refrain from the enforcement
of contracts not based on legal allocation orders. The provision can fairly be
interpreted as bestowing more power upon arbitraj. Nevertheless arbitraj has
thought it more prudent not to scrutinize the legality of allocation orders but to
let the central organs clarify such issues.201
It may well be that under the influence of the recent decentralizing trend in
Soviet economic law and in that of other planned economies, Rumania will
allow arbitraj and state enterprises a more active role in matters of illegal or
modified orders.
VI. PEPXORMNCE
A. Specific Performance
In traditional contract law, specific performance can be required only when
special circumstances are present, such as the uniqueness of the object of the
contract. Ordinarily, the debtor has a choice between specifically performing his
obligation or making payments representing the equivalent of his obligation.
Presumably the creditor is not hurt, because he can enter the free market and
"cover" by purchasing elsewhere. 20 2
The situation is quite different where consumption is planned, the flow of
goods regulated and no free market exists, leaving the creditor no possi-
bility to "cover." Money payments do not enable the holder of an allocation
order directed toward one enterprise to go out and buy from another enterprise.
Consequently, they do not really benefit the creditor who is unable to procure
the goods he has bargained for. Moreover, the fulfillment of the entire plan is
jeopardized when state enterprises are allowed to pay instead of perform.
For these reasons, it should not be surprising that the general rule is specific
performance of delivery contracts. The rationalization varies slightly from
author to author. While some believe it is the consequence of the administrative
duty to fulfill the plan,20 3 other would explain it on the basis of both the adminis-
trative and the civil duty with respect to plan fulfillment.
20 4
There is no statutory provision requiring specific performance in all cases. In
201. Witzman, supra note 166, at 5.
202. See UCC § 2-711(1) (a).
203. See, e.g., S. Statescu, supra note 113, at 289.
204. Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 18, at 141-43.
411
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
many instances, it is the PAS Who takes the initiative in formulating the princi-
ple expressly:
The fundamental rule is that economic contracts without exception
ought to be performed specifically. Performance by equivalent (com-
pensation of damages) is admissible only exceptionally when specific
performance is no longer possible.2 0 5
The formulation of the PAS is not too different from that of the Soviet authors
Novitzki and Luntz:
The principal method of satisfying the creditors is compelling the deb-
tor to perform his obligation specifically (the principle of real perfor-
mance). The awarding of a money equivalent (damages for nonper-
formance) rather than insistence on specific performance is an extreme
measure that ought not be taken by arbitraj except when performance
is no longer possible0 6
How long is it possible to demand specific performance and when does the
possibility for specific performance end? The answer depends upon the length of
operative validity of the allocation order, a concept discussed earlier in connec-
tion with prohibited clauses.20 7 As long as the allocation order has operative
validity, and this is with a few statutory exceptions the end of the fiscal year,20 8
specific performance remains a possibility and may be demanded. On the other
hand, once the allocation order loses its operative validity (expires, becomes
stale, lapses), specific performance is no longer possible, and neither may the
creditor demand it nor the debtor voluntarily comply. The PAS makes it very
clear that:
Termination of operative validity means that the task no longer exists.
Specific performance is an outgrowth of the planned task and is justi-
fied only for the purposes of insuring that the task will be performed.
Once the task has disappeared, specific performance is not only unjus-
tified, but impossible because the remedy can not exist independently
of the obligation 20 9
B. The Duty to Accept Performance
The seller's obligation of specific performance, has a correlative obligation
on the buyer's side, that of accepting performance. In Anglo-American law, both
obligations come under the same heading: the buyer's duty to accept the goods
and pay their price rather than reject them and pay damages is also referred to
as specific performance. With respect to delivery contracts the obligations not
only have different titles but are, in fact, different. Whereas specific performance
by the seller is determined by contract, the acceptance by the buyer goes beyond
the contract and is, in fact, determined by the plan. The buyer must accept late
205. Instr. PAS 2352 of March 25, 1952, in Cul. 41.
206. I. Novitzki & L. Luntz, supra note 11, at 352.
207. See generally supra Part II1/f, pp.
208. See 11CM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 9, para. 1.
209. Instr. PAS 2353 of March 25, 1953, in Cul. 42.
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performance or partial performance if the goods are useful under the plan, re-
gardless of contractual provisions.2 10 The justifications offered by Rumanian
scholars 211 and by those of other planned economies2 12 are very similar in that
they explain the duty to accept performance as the extension of the duty to ful-
fill the plan, a duty owed to society rather than to the other party to the con-
tract.
C. The Duty to Collaborate and Reciprocally Facilitate Performance
The principles of specific performance and of acceptance of performance
can be better understood in the light of an additional obligation for both parties,
that of helping each other's efforts leading toward performance. There is an ex-
press requirement created by the PAS that: "the parties.. . help each other so
that reciprocal performance be facilitated." 21 3 The authors define it as "a duty
to make contributions to the other party's performance" and vividly describe
the new species of creditors and debtors that are created as a result of such a
collaboration: ". . . socialist creditor and socialist debtor, bound by solidarity
and common interests materialized in the plan. Both parties and the entire social-
ist society have a common goal resulting from the connection of the plan with
the contract." 214
D. The Requirement of a "Comradely" Attitude
The requirement of a comradely attitude is broader than that of collabora-
tion, even though sometimes the concepts are used interchangeably or in combi-
nation, such as "'comradely' collaboration." It is difficult to adequately explain
the legal significance without referring to the political connotation of the term.
It means the attitude of a fellow communist. A "comradely" enterprise like a
fellow Communist Party member, would refrain from pursuing its own interests
when those of society are at stake; it would refrain from insisting on contract
rights that are not essential to the plan when a conciliatory attitude might better
serve the interests of plan fulfillment, and on the other hand, would go beyond
contractual or statutory duties when performing under the plan, or prove merci-
less when the interests of the plan so require.
The laws of Czechoslovakia,2 15 Hungary2 16 and Germany2 17 expressly em-
210. See Dec. PAS 1449 of June 20, 1966, [1966] 4 AS 94-95.
211. Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 187, at 165; Cioara, Sezisarea Din Oficiu a Orga-
nului Arbitral in Litigiul Precontractual [Ex officio proceedings by arbitraj in precontract
disputes), [f963] 4 AS 7-8.
212. 1. Novitzki & L. Luntz, supra note 11, at 325; Vasiliev, Teoria Contractelor de Plan
[The theory of planned contracts] ch. IV(B) (10) (Sofia 1951).
213. II Mat. 282.
214. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 167-68. See, Statescu, supra note 113,
at 226; Economu, Colaborarea Creditorulid la Executarea Obligatiei Debitorului [The col-
laboration of the creditor for the performance of the debtor], [1962] 3 SCJ 481, 484. On
spirit of collaboration in Soviet law see H. Berman, supra note 29, at 138.
215. Law of Oct. 17, 1957, § 3.
216. D. CM 50 of 1955, art. 15.
217. Law of Dec. 11, 1957, § 4.
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body the combined concept of comradely collaboration. The German law at-
tempts to describe it:
,.. socialist enterprises must prove comradely collaboration both when
contracting and When performing. Each is under an obligation to help
the other in the performance of the contract and in the fulfillment of
the plan and to take into account permanently and with respect to
every action, the influence its attitude is likely to exert upon the plan
fulfillment by the other party.218
The areas where "comradely" attitude is most often invoked are notifica-
tion of the other party when there is no statutory duty to do so and in connec-
tion with the exercise of the right of rejection.2 19 It is invoked in many other
circumstances as well. Recently, arbitraj relied upon lack of "comradely" atti-
tude and imposed liability upon a state enterprise for failure to unload a freight
car, The defendant's inaction was explained by the fact that it did not order
the goods that were erroneously shipped to it. Arbitraj criticized the enterprise
for its passivity when the interests of the economy were at stake and held that
a comradely attitude required a prompt unloading of the freight car, followed
by a notification of the seller and a request for instructions in connection with
reconsignmentL2 0
E. The Requirement of a Complete and Exact Performance
The voluminous body of central regulations would lack effectiveness if per-
formancd were allowed to differ from that required by the contract. This
prompted a declaration by PAS that: "Each contracting party has not only a
right but also a duty to insist on a complete ahd exact performance and to
enforce every possible right by using all available legal means." 221 The require-
ment of a complete and exact performance could fairly be interpreted as being
implicit in the contract itself or as being part of an expression of a "comradely"
attitude. On the other hand, the "comradely" attitude is a conglomerate concept
which includes among others a conciliatory feature, so that one could easily be
misled into believing that the buyer ought to accept performance no matter how
inadequate. In light of these, the requirement of a complete and exact perfor-
mance comes as an important limitation on the duty to be conciliatory and con-
stitutes a qualification of the "comradely" attitude doctrine.222
F. Place of Performance
Allocation orders and delivery orders do not usually specify the place of
performance. It is customary for the basic conditions of delivery to make such
218. Id. (Emphasis added.).
219. See, e.g., Dec. PAS 3184 of Oct. 8, 1962, [1963] 3 AS 70-71 (notification);
Hauser, Die Verantwortlichkeit ffir nicht Termingerecht Vertragserfulling. Die Veraniwort-
lit chkeit ffir Nichtabanahme der Leistung and Unterlassung der Mitwirkung [Liability for
late performance. Liability for rejection in breach of contract and in breach of the duty to
collaborate], in Grundfragen des Vertragssystem 119-20 (Berlin 1958).
220. Dec. Arb. Reg Cluj 833 of May 31, 1966, [1966] 5 AS 107.
221. II Mat. 285.
222. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 235.
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a specification and the most frequently used formula is: "Reception at seller's
place of busines, delivery f.o.b. common carrier locality of seller." It is not a
mandatory formula-some basic conditions of delivery depart from the general
custom and provide for another alternative while other basic conditions make
no provision, allowing the parties to determine by contract the place of perfor-
mance. However, if neither the basic conditions of delivery nor the parties
provide for a place of performance the presumption is that they intended the
customary formula.223
It is also frequently provided in basic conditions of delivery and contracts
that the seller invite the buyer to the seller's place of business for a reception of
the goods prior to delivery, and it is mandatory for the seller to make the
"autoreception" (reception for the account of the buyer) where the buyer fails
to comply with the invitation. Some basic conditions of delivery require that a
delegate of the local authorities be present when autoreception takes place.
In the great majority of cases, the buyer does not avail himself of the op-
portunity to make the reception before delivery. Autoreception is the customary
practice in all but the overly technical industries. The principal reasons account-
ing for a virtual nonexistence of receptions are the following:
(a) Lack of personnel. The organizational setup, i.e., the number of em-
ployees, their duties and their salaries are centrally regulated. 2 24 Unless an
overly technical industry is involved, state enterprises do not usually have in
their organizational setup employees that can be paid and used for such pur-
pose.
(b) Lack of travel funds. The funds allocated to state enterprises must
be spent for the purposes for which they are earmarked2 25 and one of the most
restricted and limited funds are those available for travel of employees. 22 6
(c) Submission to autoreception does not constitute a waiver of the buyer's
right to sue for damages. The presence of neutral delegates at the autoreception
does not restrict in any way buyer's right to sue. This is natural because the
delegate of the local authority does not really represent the interests of the buyer
at the autoreception. Moreover, the delegate, as a matter of practice, does not
participate at the autoreception but subsequently merely signs the documents.
The reason for this is the very small number of delegates the cities and towns
employ, e.g., Timisoara, an industrial city of 160,000 had only two delegates
on its payroll in 1962. The limited number of delegates cannot possibly partici-
223. Reg. to HCM 941 of July 25, 1959, art. 7 (reception of delivery by common car-
riers of merchandise belonging to state enterprises); See Dec. PAS 3579 of Nov. 15, 1962,
[1963] 1 AS 85-86.
224. Dec. CM 47 of Jan. 29, 1949 (duties and salaries); HCM 1037 of June 28, 1952;
HCM 3031 of Jan. 15, 1953; HCM 641 of May 15, 1954, art. 5; D. 516 of Jan. 12, 1955
(organization set up) ; HCM 693 of May 8, 1955 (salaries of technicians and administrative
personnel).
225. See HCM 3031 of Jan. 15, 1953, art. 51; HCM 693 of May 8, 1955, art. 8 Instr.
MF 2200 of 1955, classifies unauthorized use of funds as a criminal act piinishable under
Rum. Pen. Code arts. 242, 245.
226. See Reg. to HCM 858 of June 12, 1957, No. 31(b).
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pate at the same time in many different places where their presence would be
required. As a result, the delegates refrain from all participation. Rather they
remain permanently at the city hall where sellers may locate them more readily
for the purposes of obtaining the requisite signature.
The practice of autoreception is so deeply imbedded that, even though the
parties may attempt to contract against it, arbitarj will imply it into the con-
tract.2 7 Moreover, even though a statute may provide for a mandatory recep-
tion at the place of buyer,228 arbitraj will construe the statute as not being in
derogation of the general authorization for a reception at the place of the sel-
ler.229 Nevertheless, the very popular autoreception has very little, if any, legal
effect. A document of autoreception, signed by a neutral delegate, supplemented
by another document issued by the common carrier certifying that the goods
received for shipment conformed to the contract, was recently held insufficient
to prevent the buyer from suing for shortages and inferior quality, and, more-
over, was insufficient to shift the burden of proof from the seller to the buyer.2 0
G. Time of Performance
Allocation orders usually specify the trimester of performance but not the
exact date. The parties are entitled to agree upon spreading the performance
over the duration of the trimester in convenient installments. Sometimes the tri-
mester specified in the allocation order sets the limits for the duration of the
contract by terminating the operative validity of the order. This does not happen
often, and when it does it is usually in connection with the allocation of perish-
able goods.23 1 More frequently, the trimester specified in the allocation order
does not affect operative validity so that performance in a subsequent trimester
does not become illegal. 32 Moreover, late performance does not entitle the buyer
to reject the goods unless they have become absolutely useless due to the de-
lay.233 In order to recover late performance fines or damages under the provi-
sions of the Civil Code the buyer would have to serve a notice of delay, a
condition very similar to the notice of breach requirement of the UCC.234 Al-
though there is no provision dispensing with notice of delay when delivery con-
tracts are involved, the PAS has considered that:
the formality [notice of breach] is absolutely incompatible with con-
tract discipline and the principle of hozrasciot. When state enterprises
are involved, each ought to perform on the very date set forth in the
contract without the necessity of a remainder by the unit to whom
performance is owed.
227. See Dec. PAS 1562 of May 31, 1957, [1958] 2 AS 42.
228. HCM 14 of 1965, art. 4, para. 1 (reception of livestock).
229. Ans. NCA of March 24-26, 1966, [1966] 2 AS 66-67.
230. Dec. PAS 2363 of Sept. 23, 1966, [1966] 6 AS 87-88.
231. See HCM 524 of June 23, 1954, art. 9, para. 2.
232. See id. art. 9, para. 1.
233. See Dec. PAS 1449 of June 20, 1966, [1966) 4 AS 94-95.
234. See Rum. Civ. Code art. 1079, para. 1; UCC § 2-607(3) (a).
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The PAS further suggested that arbitraj apply the principle of Dies interpellat
pro homine to the effect that the contractual due date by itself constitutes a
notice of delay entitling the buyer to recover damages and fines for late perfor-
mance.
2 35
H. Imputation of Performance
A debtor occasionally may owe several past due obligations to the same
creditor. A partial performance may arguably be "imputed" against ("applied
to," "matched with") any one obligation.
Traditional contract law, as a general rule, allows the debtor to impute when
performing. In case of silence by the debtor the creditor may impute when giving
the receipt. When both parties are silent there are presumptions to the effect
that the most onerous obligation was meant to be satisfied first or that the par-
ties intended to impute against the oldest obligation first.
Rumanian law gives the debtor the customary discretion to impute per-
formance with the exception of past due interest having mandatory priority of
imputation and, in the case of silence by both parties, the presumption is that
a chronological imputation was intended.230
No express provision for a different handling of the problem when state
enterprises are involved can be found. However, the PAS has completely aban-
doned the statutory provision and created a separate rule applicable to delivery
contracts. State enterprises are denied discretion; imputation takes place in
strictly reverse-choronlogical order, that is, against the most recent obligation
first.23 7 The reasons for such a revolutionary shift relate to an equitable handling
of success indicators. Failure to perform in the first trimester of a year would
statistically show up as a late performance in all subsequent trimesters if impu-
tation were to follow the statutory pattern. This would occur because a per-
formance during the second trimester would relate back to the obligation of the
first and leave the obligation of the second unsatisfied. To prevent this and to
enable state enterprises to be successful despite a poor start, the PAS reversed
the presumption applicable to contracts between citizens. A few years later, the
PAS partially restored the right of imputation, and state enterprises now have
discretion when different contracts are involved. They still lack the power of
imputation when several installments of the same contract are due.238
In the Soviet Union, imputation is subject to contractual arrangements
between the parties and it is customary for special conditions of delivery to pro-
vide for various patterns of imputation239
235. II Mat. 357.
236. Rum. Civ. Code arts. 1110-13.
237. II Mat. 344.
238. See Instr. PAS 33 of July 6, 1957, in Cul. 254-55.
239. E. Roman & E. Gorun, Contractele Economice si Rolul Lor in Aprovizionarea
Technico-Materiala a Economiei R.P.R. [Economic contracts and their role in technical
material supply of the Rumanian economy] 65 (Buc. Ed. St. 1956).
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I. Rejection for Late Performance
There is a provision specifically authorizing the beneficiary, in case of de-
lay in performance, to notify the seller that performance of the past due obliga-
tion will not be accepted, and to refuse any attempted late-delivery.240 The
provision taken at face value would give discretion to state enterprises and would
allow rejection to become a possible course of action in relations between state
enterprises. In reality, shortly after the enactment of the decree, the PAS quali-
fied the right of rejection as: "an exceptional right to be exercised by the benefi-
ciary solely for legitimate reasons. Late performance in and of itself in insuffi-
cient grounds for rejection." 241 Thereafter he admonished arbitraj to scrutinize
carefully the legitimacy of the reasons relied upon by state enterprises when
attempting to reject for late performance. Additionally, the burden of proof was
placed on the rejecting party.242 The implementation by arbitraj of the legiti-
macy theory became a virtual judicial repeal of the right of rejection.2'4 A
recent decision, refusing the right of rejection, mentions by way of dicta what
might constitute a legitimate reason: "when the delay results in a total useless-
ness of the goods for the rejecting enterprise, under the present plan and subse-
quent plans."2 44 Rumanian scholars generally support the requirement of legiti-
macy of rejection 2 45 They consider the practice of arbitraj justifiable in view of
the fact that the statute authorizes rejection regardless of the seller's negligence
and that the limitation on the right of rejection is useful to the plan and may also
protect innocent sellers. 246
The law of Germany and that of Hungary grant the beneficiary a right to
withhold acceptance from performances of past due obligations, regardless of
fault.247 Time did not permit a research of the degree to which German and
Hungarian arbitraj have qualified the right of rejection. A leading German work
on the subject "Liability for late performance; Liability for rejection in breach
of contract and in neglect of the dity of collaborate"2 48 as the title suggests,
stands for the proposition that the right is qualified by an obligation of the pur-
chasing enterprise to collaborate with the seller and help him fulfill his plan.
On the other hand, the Bulgarian Law249 and various Special Conditions of
Delivery effective in the Soviet Union250 would tend to indicate that the Bul-
garian and Soviet practice is that of specifying in the special conditions and the
240. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 10.
241. Instr. PAS 3207 of Sept. 27, 1952.
242. II Mat. 359.
243. See Dec. PAS 3404 of Sept. 30, 19611 [1961] 6 AS 57-58; Dec. PAS 577 of Feb.
28, 1963 [1963] 3 AS 69.
244. Dec. PAS 1449 of June 20, 1966 [1966) 4 AS 94-94.
245. See S. Statescu, supra note 113, at 313; Ionascu & Barasch, supra note 187, at 262.
246. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 267.
247. Law of Dec. 11, 1957, § 43(1) (Ger.) ; Dec. CM 50 of 1955, art. 19(3) (Hung.).
248. Hauser, supra note 219.
249. Law of Nov. 1, 1963, § 33.
250. See, e.g., art. 33 (products of mass consumption), and art. 24 (sporting goods),
cited by T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 264.
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contract the precise circumstances under which the right of rejection for late
performance could be exercised.
J. Quality of Performance
In the early days of planning, there was a scarcity of goods and almost any-
thing could be sold on the domestic market without regard to quality. There was
no need for an emphasis on quality and all efforts were concentrated in the di-
rection of quantity. As productivity increased, and more goods became available,
greater concern had to be shown for better products and state enterprises had
to be educated to raise the quality of consumer goods. For this purpose, the
institution of "quality inspectors" was created, a body of technicians individually
assigned to different enterprises with duties relating exclusively to quality of
production. 25 1 The goods became standardized 252 and meeting the quality re-
quirements set by "STAS" (state standards) became a success indicator on
equal footing with quantity of production.2 5 3 The STAS were changed from time
to time and their quality requirements became more and more stringent.254 Since
1961 STAS quality no longer constitutes a target but rather a minimum that
ought to be exceeded.2 55 Quality requirements are strictly enforced. For example,
an application by a manufacturer for a waiver of recently imposed quality re-
quirements and a permission to deliver goods conforming to the prior STAS
was unsuccessful in spite of the fact that the applicant was able to prove that
his production facilities were outdated and unsuited for production meeting the
requirements of the new STAS.25 6 Generally, arbitraj authorizes a derogation
from STAS quality requirements only when the STAS itself provides for a
possibility of derogation. 257 Moreover, arbitraj penalizes the derogating manu-
facturer by initiating the promulgation by the CSP of a special low price for
the merchandise involved. 258 Intentional and unauthorized derogation from
STAS constitutes an economic crime aith the guilty employees possibly facing
criminal prosecution. 259
For a quality-raising policy to be effective, litigation involving defective
merchandise must not be discouraged. Buyers failing to make the reception of
merchandise at the seller's plant and consenting that the seller make it on their
behalf (autoreception) are not precluded from litigating the issue of quality after
another chance to inspect the goods, this time at their own place of business2 66
251. HCM 1211 of July 9, 1955, art. 4.
252. Off. St. COMSTA of March 24, 1951, in Col. 265; Off. St. COMSTA of Apr. 19,
1951, in Col. 171; Off. St. COMSTA of May 16, in Col. 227; Off. St. COMSTA of Dec. 6,
1951, in Col. 53.
253. HCM 3896 of Dec. 2, 1953, art. 9, para. 1.
254. HCM 1176 of Apr. 30, 1953; HCM 1942 of June 29, 1953; HCM 2114 of Nov.
8, 1954; HCM 939 of Aug. 4, 1955; HCM 3025 of Jan. 9, 1956.
255. 2 1CM 1800 of Jan. 9, 1961, No. 2.
256. See Dec. PAS 1467 of June 21, 1966, [1966] 4 AS 88.
257. Dec. Arb. Reg. Mures 801 of Oct. 18, 1965, [1966] 2 AS 113.
258. Dec. Pas 2728 of Nov. 13, 1965, [19661 1 AS 98.
259. Rum. Pen. Code art. 268(2) ; On the Soviet economic crime of releasing (repeat-
edly) goods of a poor quality, see H. Berman, supra note 29, at 146.
260. Dec. PAS 2363 of Sept. 23, 1966, [19661 6 AS 87-88.
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Arbitraj went even further. Actual reception by the buyer (rather than autore-
ception) was held not to constitute a waiver of the buyer's right to compensation
for inferior quality. At the same time, arbitraj held that the buyer was liable for
damages caused to the manufacturer. On the whole, the buyer recovered com-
pensation decreased by the damages he caused through negligent reception. The
PAS agreed with arbitraj that the right to compensation had not been waived.
Nevertheless, the decision was reversed on the grounds that is was an error to
decrease the compensation due to the buyer instead of making two awards deal-
ing with the rights of each party separately. The PAS pointed out that what
arbitraj did was a judicial setoff likely to interfere with an equitable administra-
tion of success indicators by failing to pinpoint negligence on both sides. The
PAS further suggested that judicial setoff is inapplicable to claims arising from
delivery contracts.2 61 Since then, judicial setoff remains mandatory for recipro-
cal claims of citizens262 and forbidden for reciprocal claims of state enterprises.
In addition to the obligation of meeting the STAS quality requirements,
sellers extend warranties coming very close to the implied warranties under the
UCC.263 There are slight differences in formulation---"absolutely satisfactory for
the purpose1264 or "fit for a certain purpose" 265 but on the whole purchasers are
well protected, and there is no possibility such as under the UCC to exclude or
modify the implied warranties.2 66
The use of state standards to insure the quality of performance is a com-
mon procedure for all planned economies for their domestic trade.26 7
K. Risk o1 Loss
The prohibition against contractual modification of liability208 was inter-
preted to prevent the parties from making a contractual allocation of the risk of
loss. The general rule is that the seller must bear the risk of loss until the mer-
chandise is accepted by a common carrier for shipment, at which point the risk of
loss shifts to the buyer.269 The only exception relates to contracts under the basic
conditions of delivery requiring performance at the buyer's place of business. In
this circumstance risk of loss remains on seller until the merchandise reaches its
destination. In practice, however, the seller always retains the risk of loss until
the merchandise is in possession of the buyer regardless of place of performance.
Three concepts account for the fact that the statutory allocation of risk is with-
261. Instr. PAS 2060 of March 14, 1953, in Cul. 33-37.
262. Rum. Civ. Code arts. 1143-46.
263. UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315.
264. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 278.
265. Cordos, Raspunderea Civila si Penala Pentru Livrari do Produse de Calitate
Necorespunzatoare [Civil and criminal liability for delivery of unsatisfactory quality goods],
[1955] 5 LP 468.
266. UCC § 2-316.
267. See, e.g., Law 109 of June 4, 1964, § 172 (Czech. Econ. Code) ; St. on Del. Prod,
art. 35, 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2, at 39 (U.S.S.R. 1959); R.S.F.S.R. Civ. Code art. 261,
2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2, at 19 (U.S.S.R. 1964).
268. HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 2, para. 5.
269. Reg. to HCM 941 of July 25, 1950, art, 21(3)(2).
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out practical significance: (1) responsibility for inadequate packaging and ship-
ing is on the seller; (2) there is a presumption that all transport losses are caused
by inadequate packaging or shipping; (3) the only way to overcome the presump-
tion is identification by the seller of the real causes accounting for the loss.2 70 In
practice, the seller can never fulfill such a burden. Proof by the seller that losses
of cement occurred through a hole in a freight car was held insufficient to over-
come the presumption of inadequate packaging or shipping, and moreover, was
interpreted as evidence of the seller's failure to inspect the freight car prior to
shipment. 271
L. Payment
The monopoly of the State Bank and Investment Bank in handling the
accounts of state enterprises and effectuating all financial transactions272 has
resulted not only in a total prohibiton against commercial credits273 and judicial
setoffs, but also in a limitation upon the various methods of payment otherwise
used by the commerical community. For instance, neither may a right to obtain
payment be assigned to a third party, nor the duty to make payment delegated.
"Assignment or delegation by involving strangers to the planned task interferes
with the effectiveness of banking control and violates banking regulations. 12 74
Moreover, the right to obtain payment cannot be waived directly or indirectly,2 75
or replaced by a right to obtain services,276 or exchanged for a right to obtain
delivery of goods.277
In contrast with the method of payment, which is not susceptible of varia-
tion, "the price is always subject to subsequent changes ordered by competent
authorities to the effect that the current official price be applied." 278 The princi-
ple as expressed by the PAS is not self-explanatory because current price in the
context of a subsequent price change may mean any one of the following al-
ternatives: (1) official at the time of delivery, (2) official at the time of payment,
or (3) official at the end of the year, that is, a retroactive application of the last
price to all transactions under the same plan. All three alternatives have been
applied at one time or another. At first, "official at the time of payment" con-
stituted the current price in the interpretation of the PAS and the basic condi-
tions of delivery prior to 1956 incorporated the second alternative. In 1956, the
PAS adopted the "official at the time of delivery" interpretation, a shift which is
reflected in all basic conditions of delivery subsequent to 1956. Furthermore, by
270. See Dec. PAS 2363 of Sept. 23, 1966, [1966] 6 AS 87-88.
271. Dec. Pas 2179 of Sept. 15, 1965, [1965] 6 AS 76-77.
272. D. 320 of Nov. 15, 1948 (state bank) ; D. 255 of Sept. 1, 1948 (investment bank).
273. D. 265 of June 25, 1949, arts. 3, 9, para. 2.
274. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 596, 600-01.
275. II Mat. 491.
276. Dec. Arb. Reg. Timisoara 797 of March 29, 1956, [1956] 5 AS 63-64.
277. Dec. PAS 911 of March 27, 1956, [1956] 5 AS 39.
278. I Mat. 48. The promulgation of official prices is entrusted to: The council of
ministers, various ministries and local authorities. D. 172 of Apr. 18, 1953; CSP: HCM 2221
of Nov. 14, 1955; CPCM: HCM 41 of Feb. 1, 1957.
421
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
1960, the PAS had realized that some price changes were intended as a rectifi-
cation of erroneous prior prices and that it would be unfair in such cases not to
give them retroactive effect. Therefore the Arbiter provided for a possibility of
retroactive price changes, if there was an unequivocal statement by the Price
Committee of the CM or the CSP that retroactivity was intended.270 This en-
couraged the Ministry of Food Products and Ministry of Agriculture to promul-
gate prices to be retroactively applied for two years. 280 Shortly thereafter,
retroactivity of the new prices was cut in half by arbitraj 28' and since then it
has been settled that the limits on retroactivity of official prices are set by the
duration of the plan.
Occasionally merchandise does not fit exactly the nomenclature of the state
standards and therefore the price becomes subject to dispute. It may even turn
out ultimately, that there is no official price for the particular merchandise.
When faced with having no official price for merchandise manufactured under a
delivery contract, arbitraj experimented with pricing and applied the prices pro-
mulgated for related goods with small adjustments upward or downward. The
procedure did not meet the approval of the PAS, who labeled it "tampering with
prices, prohibited to parties and arbitraj alike." At the same time, arbitraj was
reminded that only the central authorities have the right and duty to set prices
and that, lacking official prices, arbitraj must comply with the instructions of the
PAS of June 17, 1960, providing for a stay of litigation pending notification of
the CSP and promulgation of an official price.282 The policy of centralized price
setting and of not allowing arbitraj the slightest leeway is so strong that subse-
quently, arbitraj was instructed to consult CSP with respect to the prices when
there are the slightest derogations from the STAS as authorized by the STAS
itself,2m and recently arbitraj has ruled that the delivery of goods under a con-
tract was prohibited until the CSP had set the prices, even though the operative
validity of the allocation order expired in the interim.284
M. Mandatory Litigation
The command of the PAS is explicit: "Each contracting party has not only
the right but also the duty to demand from the other a complete and exact per-
formance and to enforce every possible right by using all available legal
means."2 85 This oft-quoted sentence expresses not only the principle of complete
and exact performance, but also that of mandatory litigation. It invites state
enterprises to file every claim they could possibly be entitled to under the law.
The PAS was more explicit when he specified that "Plaintiff must sue for spe-
cific performance, plus conventional penalties [for late performance or inferior
279. Instr. PAS 13 of June 17, 1960.
280. Order MIA & MAG 182 of 1961.
281. Dec. Arb. CM 3757 of Sept. 2, 1961.
282. Dec. PAS 263 of Jan. 31, 1963, [1963] 3 AS 65.
283. Dec. PAS 2728 of Nov. 13, 1965, [1966] 1 AS 98.
284. Dec. Arb. Nuc. 2011 of May 6, 1966, [1966] 5 AS 108-09.
285. II Mat. 285.
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quality] plus actual damages incurred.1 286 At first arbitraj followed the sugges-
tion literally and when shortly before the year end it was already certain that the
seller was unable to perform, arbitraj thought it had nonetheless a duty to re-
quire that the buyer amend his complaint for damages and include a claim for
specific performance. The result was that generally, state enterprises were dis-
abled from recovering damages without, at the same time, going through the
often hopeless ritual of a suit for specific performance. The instructions, instead
of furthering litigation, had the effect of making litigation more costly and more
difficult. This prompted a more realistic approach in 1958, when the PAS au-
thorized arbitraj to entertain a complaint solely for damages when it appeared
that specific performance could not be obtained.287 As a result of the new ap-
proach, litigation became more prompt, and the practice of some state enter-
prises of waiting until the end of the plan with a suit for damages alone, rather
than suing promptly for damages plus specific performance, was no longer justi-
fied. Nevertheless, the legal community gave the new approach a mixed recep-
tion. Some scholars denounced it as a " . . . dangerous retreat from planning
discipline and from the principle of specific performance preventing arbitraj
from securing plan fulfillment in situations when it ought to try and may suc-
ceed,"2 8 8 while others greeted and acclaimed it as a manifestation of socialist
realism.289 The exception created by the PAS is far less important than it would
seem from the vehemence of the debate, as long as compulsory litigation to the
fullest extent of all rights remains the rule, with respect to damages, fines, and
penalties in all cases and with respect to specific performance when there is the
slightest chance that it may be obtained.
N. Active Role of Arbitraj
Implementing the principle of compulsory litigation, arbitraj either directs
the parties to amend their complaints or invites them to make oral arguments
with respect to further claims that ought to be litigated. The latter procedure
is called "to subject additional claims to discussion by the parties" and has the
advantage of being more expedient than the former. Failure of arbitraj to de-
tect the claims that were omitted by the parties and to subject them to discus-
sion constitutes a reversible error, commonly referred to as "failure to practice
an active role." Active role is defined as "an obligation to help the parties in
vindication of their legal rights" and does not constitute a monopoly of arbi-
traj, 20 but is a judicial attitude mandatory for ordinary courts as well. As ap-
plied to ordinary courts, it has never been interpreted as requiring the judges to
help draw the complaint, with the exception of cases involving alimony and lay-
286. Instr. PAS 2014 of May 11, 1953.
287. Instr. PAS 9 of Nov. 21, 1958.
288. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 323.
289. D. Florescu & D. Popescu, Arbitrajul de Stat si Procesul Arbitral in R.P.R.
[Arbitraj and the arbitral process in Rumania] 393 (Buc. Ed. Ac. 1960).290. Reg. of Aug. 18, 1954, art 28, to HCM 1397 of Aug. 3, 1954 (rules of procedure
for arbitraj).
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men acting as their own attorney. Arbitraj, on the other hand, no matter what the
size of a state enterprise's legal staff, must make sure that no conceivable claim
has been overlooked. This may seem an educational device teaching lawyers to
do a good job or an equitable way of relieving state enterprises from the conse-
quences of inefficient representation. But in reality things are completely diff-
erent. On the one hand, attorneys understand precisely what they are doing when
they refrain from making all claims. They are aware of the difficulties the adver-
sary is facing; they are cognizant of the impact of law suits on success indica-
tors in deteriorating the chances of the loser without at the same time improving
those of the winner; they would prefer to maintain good relations for the future
by not causing defendant's management to lose its bonuses. On the other hand,
additional compensation or fines generally do not represent a profit for the win-
ner in so far as the enterprise may have to deposit them into a special fund, or
may be entitled to use them only for specified purposes or may see its own allo-
cation of funds reduced accordingly.2 91 Consequently, active role does not come
into play to help state enterprises and their attorneys but rather prevents them
from exercising an informed and deliberate waiver.
The purpose behind the principle is obvious, and it is the same which lead
to the banning of judical setoffs: arbitraj should not be hindered in pinpointing
negligence of state enterprises. Complacent restraint in litigation must be over-
come by a vigilant active role if unworthy management is to be prevented from
collecting bonuses.
VII. CONSEQUENCES OF BREACH
A. Liability for Fault v. Strict Liability
The general rule in all planned economies is that liability for breach of
delivery contracts is predicated on fault. The differences between various coun-
tries are limited to the exceptions from the rule, that is, the areas of strict lia-
bility and the burden of proof. The general pattern is that of a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence in most circumstances and an absolute presumption
of negligence-resulting in strict liability-in a few specified situations.
The burden of proof necessary to overcome the presumption is generally a very
difficult one. Czechoslovakian law serves as a typical example:
The organization [state enterprise] shall free itself of its liability if it
proves that it could not have prevented the damage even by exerting
all the efforts it can be expected to make. However, it may not free it-
self of its liability by pointing to the fact that it was implementing the
measures of superior organs.292
The German and Hungarian counterparts are very similar in nature.293
Rumanian law provides that:
291. See D. 570 of Oct. 27, 1956; Instr. MF 2044 of May 6, 1957; HCM 350 of March
6, 1957; HCM 1133 of July 17, 1957.
292. Law 109 of June 4, 1964 § 1452(2) (Czech. Econ. Code).
293. Law of Dec. 11, 1957, §§ 37-38 (Ger.); D. CM 50 of 1955 § 3, para. 1 (Hung.).
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The debtor of an obligation will be held to pay compensation for breach
or late performance even though there was no bad faith on its part pro-
vided it fails to prove that the breach was due to foreign causes be-
yond its responsibility. No compensation will be awarded when the
breach was caused by act of God or accident.2 94
The standard of care in the quoted passage of the Czech Law seems to be
determined by a subjective test, namely, the efforts the breaching enterprise can
be expected to make. In contrast, the standard in Rumanian law is objective:
"the question to be asked is whether the leading enterprise in the field could
have performed under the circumstances by exerting utmost care and dili-
gence." 29 5 Hungarian scholars believe that the test applied in Hungary should
be objective and require a very high standard, on the grounds that an average
enterprise or a reasonable enterprise is inappropriate for activity connected with
the plan.290
In practice, the standard of care required of Rumanian enterprises ap-
proaches strict liability. It is no defense that one's own supplier failed to
deliver necessary materials or that a machine broke down. There is a presump-
tion that a collaboration with the supplier would have induced him to deliver in
time and that the machine could have remained functional through better up-
keep. Applying the presumption, arbitraj constantly imposes liability under the
circumstances. There are a few exceptional cases to the contrary. In one case,
indispensable materials being imported failed to arrive in time at the defendant's
plant. It was held that the defendant was not negligent because: "foreign sup-
pliers can not be expected to collaborate comradely with Rumanian state enter-
prises so that defendant could not do anything about the delay." 297 In another
case, a machine broke down after its life expectancy had terminated and after
repeated applications for its replacement were denied by the Ministry. Arbitraj
held that defendant could not prevent normal wear of the machine by better
upkeep, that it had done everything a leading enterprise was expected to do, and
that it could not be held responsible for the Ministry's failure to grant the appli-
cation. 2 8 But generally, the fault of the Ministry is no excuse to the subordinate
enterprise. For example, in one instance the Ministry ordered the defendant to
stop all deliveries and hold its inventory for export purposes. The enterprise
complied and requested that its plan be changed. The Ministry did not reduce
the plan and the defendant was held liable to domestic customers to whom it had
failed to deliver by complying with the stop order.2 99
"Despite the general requirement that there is no liability for breach of contract without
fault . . . a fictitious fault is assumed to exist." See H. Berman, supra note 29, at 136.
294. Rum. Civ. Code arts. 1082-83.
295. Dec. PAS 974 of Apr. 30, 1958, [1959] 2 AS 56-57. See generally T. Ionascu &
E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 375.
296. Gorgey, Le Responsabilite Contractuelle des Entreprises d'dtat [Contractual lia-
bility of state enterprises], [19631 2 Rev: du Dr. 65.
297. Dec. Arb. Reg. Cluj 1152 of June 11, 1956, [1956] 6 AS 66.
298. See Dec. Arb. CM 3107 of Aug. 11, 1961, [1962] 1 AS 75.
299. See Dec. Arb. CM 64 of Jan. 16, 1958, [1958] 4 AS 57.
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There are only two situations in which what would otherwise be a breach is
authorized without a corresponding revision of the plan or reduction of the
orders: (a) when technological advancement reduces or eliminates the need for
the allocated merchandise the beneficiary may cancel part or all of his order;
and (b) when technological advancement enables a manufacturer to produce
superior products and thereby reduce his output of inferior products allocated
to the beneficiary, he may deliver a lesser quantity.300 In both circumstances the
desirability of technological advancement overrides contract discipline and the
innovator is allowed to breach without compensating the other party. The PAS
may be credited with this development when he stated that: "Innovation is a
common goal of both parties. It has an exceptional value for the development of
our planned economy. Arbitraj should avoid discouraging it by imposing liability
on innovators in connection with their innovation."' 30 1
B. The Right of Rejection
The general rule is that a beneficiary may reject the goods delivered in
violation of contractual obligations, such as late delivery or of substandard
quality. Absolute on its face, the right was qualified by the PAS and in case of
late performance there is an express order of the PAS that the beneficiaries
must prove additional legitimate reasons if they intend to reject.3 02 The only
legitimate reason accepted by arbitraj to the present date is that the merchan-
dise has become useless to the buyer because of the delay.0 3 Although the PAS
never expressly qualified the right of rejection for inferior quality, it has univer-
sally been held that the same "additional legitimate reasons" qualification
which is applicable when delay is involved, must also apply to inferior quality.304
The extension of the doctrine is due partly to the obligation of all buyers
to demand specific performance and partly to the absolute right of sellers to
cure defective performance, a right that extends beyond the date of delivery
et forth in the contract. By virtue of these two concepts, the seller is in a
situation td recondition the goods or replace them and later redeliver them to
the buyer with the result that what started out as a breach for inferior quality
ends as merely late performance.
The following excerpt is illustrative of the interplay of legal concepts
which in effect wipe out the right of rejection for inferior quality:
Delivery of merchandise of an unsatisfactory quality may produce
one of the following consequences:
(a) The beneficiary will recondition the goods at the ex-
penses of seller or,
300. Dec. Arb. Reg. Iasi 76 of Jan. 27, 1966 [1966] 3 AS 108.
301. Witzman, Cauzele de Exonerare de Raspundere, Altele Decit Forte Majora si
Culpa Creditoruhld in Raporturile Dintre Organizatii Socioliste [Excuses from liability of
state enterprises, other than acts of God or negligence of the creditor], [1961] 6 JN 21, 23.
302. Instr. PAS 3207 of Sept. 27, 1952.
303. See Dec. PAS 1449 of June 20, 1966, [1966] 4 AS 94-95.
304. See T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 481-82.
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(b) The beneficiary will deduct from the price, the difference
in value between what was contracted for and what was
delivered, provided the deduction is in accordance with
price legislation and conventional penalties applicable to
substandard deliveries, or
(c) The beneficiary will send the goods to seller for recon-
ditioning or substitution, or
(d) The beneficiary will reject the goods.
At the same time, the purchasing enterprise is under a duty to
demand specific performance rather than damages from the seller,
to whom an opportunity must be granted to correct his errors and in
line with planning discipline make a complete and exact performance.
Such duty cannot be avoided by simply rejecting the goods, unless
the enterprise is justified to do so because at the time the goods
would meet the contractual standard of quality, they would no longer
be useful to the purchaser. 30 5
The right to cure is so powerful that in some cases it may extend not
only beyond the contractual date of delivery but also into the next year,
that is, beyond the operative validity of the allocation order. The PAS has
authorized this result, which seems somewhat in conflict with the annual
character of planning, by relying on a theory that delivery and cure are two
distinct obligations:
It happens that the beneficiary demands reconditioning of the goods
to meet the quality requirements of the contract. The seller is under
a duty to recondition in the shortest possible time and does so within
the same year. No problems are presented in connection with the
allocation order because it is still operative. Sometimes reconditioning
can not be achieved within the same year and it has been suggested
that it would be illegal to deliver reconditioned goods in a subse-
quent year because the allocation order has expired. This is not so
because only the initial delivery was based on the allocation order;
after that, the duty to improve the performance and raise its quality
to the legal and contractual standard constitutes a distinct and inde-
pendent obligation.30 6
While the arguments relied upon are often criticized, the result reached is
generally accepted by the legal community. 30 7 The alternative theory sug-
gested is that the right to cure is implicit in Art. 11 D. 167 (1958) as modified
by D. 218 of July 1, 1960, which authorizes implied warranties for hidden de-
fects to extend beyond the year's end and also extends the seller's obligation
to recondition goods with hidden defects. "We can see no economic or legal
interests that require a longer period for reconditioning of hidden defects and
a shorter period for visible ones. '308 The alternative theory fails to recognize
305. See E. Roman & E. Gorun, supra note 239, at 126.
306. Instr. PAS 4542 of March 20, 1954, in Cul. 95-96.
307. See Eminescu, Raspunderea Pentru Executarea Calitativ Necorespgingtoare a
Contractuhi de Furnizare [Liability for unsatisfactory quality performance of a delivery
contract], [1957] 4 JN 634-35.
308. T. Ionascu & E. Barasch, supra note 187, at 493.
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that customarily the statute limitations for suits based on warranties against
hidden defects start to run from discovery;80 9 that the seller's right to cure tradi-
tionally terminates on the date of delivery or a few days later,310 and that the
two concepts are totally differentl Whatever the underlying theory, the results
of extending the right to cure into a post-plan year are a reduction in the
number of unfulfilled tasks and a softening of the chain reaction impact any
nonfulfillment is likely to cause in a planned economic system.
C. Measure of Damages: Compensation v. Fines
The general rule is the traditional right of plaintiff to be compensated
for actual losses and unrealized gains-damnum emergens and lucrum cessans.
To state enterprises the rule is applied with utmost care in order to avoid any
speculative damages. Thus, losses incurred must be absolutely fixed and certain,
paid out-of-pocket expenses. The example given by the PAS is illustrative:
By virtue of the principle of mandatory litigation a manufacturer may
be in a position to predict the number of law suits he will be sub-
jected to and the approximate quantum of compensation he will be
held to pay to his customers. However, when suing his own supplier
for nondelivery of goods which caused him to breach, he may not
demand compensation in excess of what he did actually incur to the
date of the law suit. Regardless of how reasonably he can foresee his
future damages, he must vindicate them in a separate law suit.81'
Further, unrealized gains are measured by planned gains and it is not open
to plaintiff to prove that he would have overfulfilled the plan and made more
profit.312
In most cases the general rule for actual damages is superseded by an
elaborate system of conventional damages called penalties or fines. Their
quantum is set forth in the basic conditions of delivery. A customary late per-
formance fine is 0.3% per diem of the value of goods that have been delivered
after the contract date, but on occasion basic conditions of delivery provide
for late performance fines anywhere between 0.1% and 0.5%. There is no
customary inferior quality penalty, and some basic conditions state separate
penalties for various breaches such as 2%o for lower density, 3% for excess
humidity, and 4%o for inadequate colors. Others call for a uniform 7%o penalty
for any kind of breach with respect to quality. On the whole, experience has
shown that in most cases conventional penalties yield compensation in excess
of actual damages. Moreover, plaintiffs are under no duty to prove the quantum
of damages when they demand conventional penalties or fines. It is only when
conventional damages are inferior to actual damages, that plaintiffs have to
309. See, e.g., UCC § 2-508(1).
310. See, e.g., id. § 2-508(2).
311. Instr. PAS 2177 of March 20, 1953, in Cul. 38-39. see also Instr. PAS 6838 of
Aug. 4, 1953, in Cul. 64-65. On similar measure of damages in Soviet law, see H. Berman,
supra note 29, at 135.
312. II Mat. 383.
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carry the burden of proof in order to recover the excess. Generally, there are
too many difficulties and risks involved in pursuing actual rather than con-
ventional damages. The risks are in what is commonly referred to as "exclu-
sive causation" which translated into concepts familiar to Anglo-American
jurists means a double burden of proof with respect to freedom of contributory
negligence and mitigation of damages. If any part of the damage can be at-
tributed to plaintiff's own negligence or his failure to mitigate, arbitraj will
separate the quantum of damages caused by each party and thereby spoil
plaintiff's success indicators.313 The possibility of losing bonuses by subjecting
plaintiff's own activity to judicial scrutiny has a strong tendency to discourage
suits for compensation in excess of conventional damages. Ironically, the
plaintiffs would claim actual damages not in order to get more but rather to
recover less from the defendant. They would prefer a lower rather than higher
award because they may not benefit from higher awards that have to be paid
over into special funds and they may be interested in not antagonizing de-
fendant's management by spoiling the success indicators. 14 They cannot waive
their right for conventional damages and claim lesser actual ones. The principle
of compulsory litigation prevents them from doing so.315 Not even arbitraj
can relieve defendants from the burdens of an excessive conventional damages
award. Occasionally, the conventional damages may absorb a substantial part
of the purchase price. A six month delay at the customary 0.3% rate will wipe
out more than 50% of the value of the goods. In other instances conventional
damages may be in excess of the purchase price and the seller would have
to deliver the goods and also make payments to the beneficiary. It is only with
respect to damages in excess of the purchase price that arbitraj has the duty
to grant relief; it cannot make a reduction of fines wiping out the sellers' right
to be paid.8 16 This is in contrast with Soviet law where the parties may elect
actual or conventional damages,317 and arbitraj has the power to reduce dis-
proportionately high fines and penalties.3 18 The difference in approach is
due to the reluctance of Rumanian judges to apply harsh penalties and the
feeling that arbitraj would probably make it a standard practice to reduce the
conventional penalties if it were free to grant relief.
D. Third Party Practice, Impleader
In ordinary courts where the Code of Civil Procedure has not been super-
seded by instruction of the PAS, or rules of procedure for arbitraj, 819 there is
a liberal third party practice and efforts are made to see that all connected
313. See Instr. PAS 2060 of March 14, 1953, in Cul. 33-37; Economu, supra note 214,
at 481-84.
314. D. 570 of Oct. 27, 1956; Instr. MF 2044 of May 6, 1957; HCM 350 of March
6, 1957; HCM 1133 of July 17, 1957.
315. See Instr. PAS 2014 of May 11, 1953.
316. Dec. PAS 549 of March 8, 1966, [1966] 3 AS 95.
317. See R.S.F.S.R. Civ. Code art. 189, 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2 at 15 (U.S.S.R. 1964).
318. Id. art. 190, 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2, at 15 (U.S.S.R. 1964).
319. Reg. of Aug. 18, 1954, to HCM 1397 of Aug. 3, 1954.
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problems be resolved in a single law suit.320 The multiplicity of law suits
does not appear to constitute an evil in the eyes of the PAS, who has downgraded
third party practice to the rank of a subsidiary procedure, followed only when
there is no other way for defendant to exercise his rights against a third party. 21
The circumstance, in which impleader is most likely to be permitted, is that of
a statute limitation that would run if defendant manufacturer were to litigate
the principal suit first and sue his own supplier later. Statute limitations are
generally very short, e.g., three years for all suits between private citizens, two
years for claims against the State Insurance Company, eighteen for suits in-
volving state enterprises generally and six months for damages arising from
defective performance of a delivery contract . 22 This accounts for the fact that
there is still a certain amount of third party practice going on. In contrast with
the traditional type of impleader, where liability over is limited by the amount
involved in the principal suit, in the case of third party practice involving state
enterprises, liability over depends entirely upon conventional damages and may
exceed the liability imposed in the principal suit.323
E. The Customary Type of Litigation for Breach of Contract
A great variety of legal questions are litigated by state enterprises, but
the number of law suits involving interesting issues is relatively small. A sub-
stantial part of arbitral practice involves a customary type of litigation that
can be described as follows:
Plaintiff sues for conventional damages for late performance. Defendant
claims that "acts of God" have prevented him from a timely delivery. Arbitraj
invites the parties to make oral arguments with respect to additional fines that
should be litigated, by reason of plaintiff's failure to apply the correct per-
centage figure or the real value of the merchandise belatedly delivered. After the
preliminary arguments on the additional claims subjected to discussion by the
parties, arbitraj orders that the object of the law suit be raised so as to include
additional fines. Thereafter, the parties are invited to make preliminary argu-
ments with respect to the admissibility of the defense. Promptly thereafter, the
defense is thrown out for failure to state circumstances amounting to "acts of
God." This implicitly takes care of the problem of negligence so that the only
remaining issue is that of the quantum of damages. The parties are again
invited to make oral arguments and the decision is handed down from the
bench. The average suit lasts less than thirty minutes; it is the practice of
arbitraj to schedule for every judge two disputes for each hour, i.e., from
8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and it does not often occur that the parties have to
320. See Rum. Code Civ. Proc. arts. 57-66.
321. See Dec. PAS 1277 of May 25, 1963, [1963] 4 AS 68-69.
322. See D. 164 of 1958, arts. 3-4, as modified on July 15, 1960. An identical six
month statute of limitations exists in Czechoslovakia and Russia. Law 109 of June 4, 1964,
§ 198(1) (Czech. Econ. Code); R.S.F.S.R. Civ. Code art. 262, 2 Soy. Stat. & Dec. No. 2,
at 20 (U.S.S.R. 1965).
323. See D. 265 of June 25, 1949, art. 2(k) ; HCM 524 of June 23, 1951, art. 5(k).
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wait for their turn. The judges can comfortably handle a load of fourteen
suits because the few lively debates-mainly planning changes, technological
advancements, or stop orders from the Ministry-are more than offset by a
multitude of five minute routine law suits.
F. The Modern Contract Law
The private sector of the economy has become insignificant in comparison
with the socialist sector,3 24 and therefore significant development of traditional
contract law has not taken place over the period of almost twenty years that
has elapsed since the bulk of the economy was nationalized. 325 Nevertheless,
a brand new contract law has emerged for the socialist sector. This is only partly
the work of the legislative or executive department of the government. A sub-
stantial contribution to the modern contract law of Rumania was made by two
distinguished law professors who held the position of PAS from the early start
of arbitraj to the present day. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, presently the premier of
Rumania, a former lawyer, law professor, and member of the Academy of
Legal Sciences, was the first to be nominated. He made a lasting contribution
by editing the first volume of the Materialul, probably the most important
source of modern contract law. His successor, Professor Marcu Witzman, an
equally distinguished, member of the Academy of Legal Sciences, must be
credited with the second volume of the Materialul and an important number
of comprehensive instructions dealing with various legal problems that tradi-
tionalists would have referred to the legislature.
On the whole, the genesis of a modern contract law can be characterized
as a common law development. A superficial and sketchy reporting system makes
an institutional analysis rather difficult. Nevertheless, such analysis is indis-
pensable for an understanding of the adaptation of the Napoleonic Civil Code
to the exigencies of a command economy.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The Rumanian contract of delivery is a highly regulated institution. Not
only is contracting mandatory to the full extent of the delivery and/or alloca-
tion order, but the basic conditions of delivery, state standards, mandatory
clauses, prohibited clauses and official prices substantially determine the con-
tent of the contract. Moreover, the delivery contract itself is often superseded
by such techniques as an implied incorporation of basic economic policies, up-
dating by arbitraj, overhaul of the plan, retroactive price changes, and extra-
324. The private sector in agriculture is still significant. However, it is subjected to
special legislation and contracting of farm products is not governed by the Civil Code but
D. 13 of Jan. 25, 1952, and HCM 2089 of Oct. 5, 1955, as modified, HCM 2228 of Dec. 21,
1956.
325. Law 119 of June 11, 1948 (nationalization of the principal means of production);
D. 232 of Sept. 9, 1948 (nationalization of certain railroads); D. 302 of Nov. 3, 1948(nationalization of hospitals and laboratories); D. 303 of Nov. 3, 1948 (nationalization of
the movie industry) ; D. 134 of Apr. 2, 1949 (nationalization of urban pharmacies) ; D. 418
of May 16, 1953 (nationalization of rural pharmacies).
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contractual "advance-action" or comradely obligations. Equally regulated are
the remedies. Not only is litigation mandatory to the full extent of legal rights,
but the remedies are limited to specific performance plus conventional penalties,
with the quantum of penalties predetermined. When occasionally the law
appears to make an exception by allowing refusal to contract or rejection of
nonconforming goods, arbitraj is prompt in taking away such right by condi-
tioning its exercise to some additional legitimate grounds. On the whole, it
seems as though Rumania is the least liberal planner among all planned econo-
mies.
On the other hand, there is a high respect for the contract theory and the
contractual form. Whenever possible, a doctrine based on contract law is selected
and the contractual form is never dispensed with. There is a real concern for
having the parties deal with each other. Contracting campaigns start early; late
contracting fines are stiff, and concomitant contracts are accorded limited
effects. These circumstances put pressure on state enterprises to get in touch
promptly and deal with each other. Moreover, the adversary system is care-
fully preserved for litigation; all additional claims that are suggested by arbitraj
must be subjected to discussion by the parties, and all state enterprises must
have adequate legal representation. The over all picture conveyed is that of
an arms-length bargaining and litigation between independent enterprises.
There is an obvious conflict between form and substance. Such contra-
diction may be explained in part by the fact that the statutory law based on the
Napoleonic Code suffered only minor changes with many of the attorneys
handling economic law being rather conservative French-trained people. How-
ever, it is equally true that the form as crystallized is perfectly capable of
supporting another change, this time toward liberalization. The same formali-
ties will have to be completed, the same ritual will be followed by the same
enterprises, but there will be more meaning to it, more freedom, more decisions.
Similarly, the same litigation will take place between the same parties but
there will be both a real election of remedies and a real possibility of waiver.
All these institutional changes may take place without institutional upset since
the contract of delivery will be a perfect safety valve for a smooth and orderly
transformation.
When is such a liberalization likely to occur? There is no sign in legal
periodicals. The research for this article has exposed no reflection of the de-
bates on Liebermanism, decentralization or liberalization that are continuing
in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. This is because Rumanians know that
it is less painful to adopt a system that has been successfully employed by
another country than to be an avant-gardiste. One would safely conclude that
no revolutionary changes should be expected until and unless Soviet and
Czechoslovak experience proves successful.
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